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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the role of institutional trading in the emergence of hedge fund activism – 
an important corporate governance mechanism.  We demonstrate that institutional sales raise a 
firm’s probability of becoming an activist target.  Further, by exploiting the funding circumstances 
of individual institutions, we establish that such effects occur through a liquidity channel – the 
activist camouflages his purchases among other institutions’ liquidity sales.  Additional evidence 
supports our conclusion.  First, activist purchases closely track institutional sales at the daily 
frequency.  Second, such synchronicity is stronger among targets with lower expected monitoring 
benefits, suggesting that gains from trading with other institutions supplement these benefits in the 
activist’s targeting decision.  Finally, we find that institutional sales accelerate the timing of a 
campaign at firms already followed by activists rather than attract attention to unlikely targets.  
Taken together, our findings offer a novel empirical perspective on the liquidity theories of 
activism; while activists screen firms on the basis of fundamentals, they pick specific targets at a 
particular time by exploiting institutional liquidity shocks.  
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1. Introduction 
Hedge fund activism is an important governance mechanism associated with significant 
improvements in the performance and governance of targeted firms (see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas, 2008; Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008; Clifford, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009).1  
Prior literature has established that activists target firms with particular fundamentals, such as low 
payout and leverage (see survey by Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2010), and market characteristics, such 
as high institutional ownership and stock liquidity (Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013; and Norli, 
Ostergaard, and Schindele, 2014).  However, these characteristics alone cannot explain why 
certain firms get targeted at certain times while others that fit the same profile do not.2  In this 
paper, we provide new evidence that institutional trading is critical in determining an activist’s 
specific target choice and time of entry, and ultimately the scale of activism. 
We start with the observation that institutions sell an unusually large fraction of their ownership 
in target firms in the months leading up to the activist campaigns.  Institutional selling appears to 
be positively associated with a firm’s probability of becoming an activist target, even after 
controlling for firm characteristics shown in the literature to impact targeting, including general 
stock liquidity.  In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in institutional selling 
volume is associated with a 0.45% increase in the probability of being targeted (one-fifth of the 
unconditional probability of 2.33%).  This effect is larger than that of most fundamentals (e.g., 
leverage) and stronger among firms with characteristics conducive to activism. 
To investigate the economic mechanism, we rely primarily on the theoretical model of Maug 
(1998) and other similar liquidity theories (Kahn and Winton, 1998; Kyle and Vila, 1991; Back, 
Li, and Ljungqvist, 2014; and others). Though different in their assumptions and (in some cases) 
predictions, these theories share the premise that non-activist shareholders are noise traders whose 
liquidity trades allow the activist to camouflage his purchases and gain on his newly acquired 
shares after declaring his activist intentions.3  These (expected) trading gains are critical in 
covering the activist’s monitoring costs, making a campaign financially viable, and hence, raising 
the probability of an intervention.   
                                                             
1 Prior work has shown that among activist investors, hedge funds achieve better success as monitors than mutual 
funds, pension funds, and labor unions (see Karpoff, 2001; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Gillan and Starks, 2007). 
2 In any given year, hundreds of firms look like viable activist targets as their predicted probabilities of being targeted, 
based on fundamentals and market characteristics, are at least as high as the 25th percentile of the sample of targets. 
3 We focus on trading by institutions rather than retail investors for a few reasons. First, institutions hold the majority 
of shares in public firms, particularly firms targeted by activists. Second, retail investors are small but many; 
consequently, unless there is an aggregate macro shock (affecting all firms), retail investors’ liquidity trades in a 
particular stock are likely to have little impact on order imbalances.  Finally, institutional transaction data are more 
readily available and representative, while retail transaction data often come from a very small group of investors over 
a short time period.  We do not in any way suggest that institutions are uninformed. 
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In testing the liquidity theories, we capture institutional liquidity trades by using fire-sale based 
instrumental variables (see Coval and Stafford, 2007; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012).  
Specifically, we extract each institution’s trades that are driven by institution-specific funding 
constraints, unrelated to information about any particular firm or the activist’s intention to launch 
a campaign.  Our results show that it is through the liquidity channel that institutional selling raises 
a firm’s probability of being targeted.4 
We develop three novel hypotheses that capture the economic mechanism of the liquidity theories. 
First, these theories posit that institutional selling allows the activist, who already recognizes that 
his monitoring will improve the firm’s fundamental value, to quickly purchase additional shares 
at unrevealing prices, thus accelerating the timing of the campaign.  We find evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis.  By estimating discrete-time proportional hazard models, we show that a one 
standard deviation decrease in institutional net volume reduces the time in which a quarter of the 
firms will be targeted by about 2.38 years (from 11.79 to 9.41 years). Thus, all else being equal, 
the scale of activism should increase in periods in which non-activist institutions experience 
negative funding shocks.   
Second, the camouflage mechanism that underlies the liquidity theories predicts that the activist’s 
purchases must closely track institutional sales so that the market maker is unable to differentiate, 
with certainty, between informed and uninformed orders.  To investigate this prediction, we zoom 
in at the daily frequency using two unique datasets – a hand-collected dataset of activist trades in 
the period leading up to the activist campaigns and a representative dataset of institutional buy and 
sell transactions.  We find that institutional sales and hedge fund purchases are highly synchronous 
at the daily frequency, consistent with the camouflage mechanism.  A 1% increase in daily 
institutional selling volume is associated with a 0.26% increase in hedge fund buying volume.  
To ensure that the demonstrated synchronicity is indeed driven by institutional liquidity sales, we 
again employ fire-sale based instruments but, in the absence of daily flow data, we infer the 
institutions’ funding needs by studying their trading behavior across a large set of stocks.5 
Specifically, we predict the buying and selling probabilities of each institution in a generic firm’s 
stock as a function of its trading in other stocks outside the generic firm’s industry and use these 
                                                             
4 Our use of institutional funding circumstances for identification should not be interpreted as suggesting that activists 
need to forecast these funding circumstances in order to pick a target firm.  In reality, the activists may use a variety 
of trading approaches, such as limit orders etc., to take advantage of market conditions generated by institutional 
liquidity sales that may affect some firms but not others. 
5 Coval and Stafford (2007) show that mutual funds, experiencing large inflows (outflows), tend to proportionally 
scale up (down) their stock holdings.  Thus, if an institution trades a firm in response to its own funding shocks, then 
its trading in that firm must be proportional to its trading in other firms.  
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predicted trades as instruments.6 Our instrumental variable results confirm that institutional sales 
significantly increase hedge fund purchases. 
Finally, we investigate the central idea of the liquidity theories that the activist covers his 
monitoring costs by supplementing the monitoring benefits that accrue to his initial stake with 
gains from trading with uninformed investors.  In firms with higher net benefits, the activist will 
be less reliant on trading gains.  To test this substitution hypothesis, we study the sample of targets 
to determine whether the synchronicity between institutional sales and hedge fund purchases varies 
with the expected activism benefits.  We use two alternative measures of benefits, one based on 
the observed characteristics of typical targets and the other based on the revealed preference of 
known activist hedge funds.  Consistent with the liquidity theories, we find that a 1% decrease in 
institutional net volume increases hedge fund purchase volume by 0.18-0.26% in the sample with 
below median expected benefits but by only 0.10-0.12% in the sample with above median benefits. 
This implies that institutional trading may play a more critical role in recent years when activists 
are moving from “low hanging fruits” to potential targets for which the costs of intervention are 
higher relative to the benefits. 
Our findings contribute to the growing literature on hedge fund activism, which has shown that 
institutional investors are important in the evolution and success of an activist campaign.  We 
provide new evidence that institutions, through their trading, also affect the activist’s decision to 
initiate a campaign in the first place. Our results indicate that institutional selling creates market 
conditions that permit a fast and discreet formation of an activist block.  Thus, we provide direct 
empirical support to Maug (1998) and other similar liquidity theories, which study the role of noise 
trading as a mechanism that allows a large investor to gain from trading against uninformed 
shareholders and become an active monitor. 
More broadly, our findings also contribute to the general corporate governance literature, 
particularly as it relates to the role of liquidity in shareholder monitoring.  In this literature, 
blockholders use either voice or the threat of exit to bring about change.  Edmans et al. (2013) 
demonstrate that unconditionally stock liquidity improves governance by voice but conditional on 
a block being formed, is more conducive to governance by exit.  Norli et al. (2014) show that 
cross-sectional differences in liquidity are positively correlated with both the likelihood of 
shareholder activism and the accumulation of target shares immediately preceding the activism 
announcement. In contrast, Back et al. (2014) show that conditional on the existence of an already 
large block, liquidity has a harmful effect on governance (consistent with Coffee, 1991; and Bhide, 
1993). These empirical studies consider stock liquidity as a persistent firm characteristic and relate 
                                                             
6 Note that we use all stocks, not just targets, in our estimation to ensure that we capture the general patterns of trading 
due to each institution’s funding circumstances and that our estimates are not biased by the ex-post classification of 
stocks into targets and non-targets. 
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its cross-sectional variation to shareholder monitoring.  In contrast, we interpret liquidity (in Maug 
(1998) and other similar theories) as the price impact of large trades, not the average price impact 
of all trades, and therefore focus on large liquidity shocks, which determine market depth and its 
transient changes, most critical to activist investors.  
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on the trading behavior of hedge funds and, more 
generally, informed traders.7 We offer an institutional explanation for the results of Collin-
Dufresne and Fos (2015), who show that informed traders strategically trade stocks on days with 
better liquidity.  Our findings are also consistent with those of Sias and Whidbee (2010), who show 
that institutional investors trade on the opposite side of insiders and are likely to provide liquidity 
necessary for the insiders to trade. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 develops a conceptual framework and formulates specific 
empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes the hedge fund activism sample. Section 4 investigates 
the relationship between institutional trading and activist targeting at the annual/quarterly 
frequency, and studies the economic mechanism underlying the liquidity theories.  Section 5 
examines at the daily frequency the effects of institutional selling on the activist’s acquisition of 
target shares.  Here, we also present evidence that our results are robust to other explanations.  
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
To investigate the role of institutional selling in hedge fund activism, we develop a series of 
empirical hypotheses based on the theoretical contributions of Maug (1998) and other similar 
theories such as Kahn and Winton (1998), Kyle and Vila (1991), Back, Li, and Ljungqvist (2014) 
and others, to which we refer collectively as liquidity theories.  
Maug (1998) develops a model in which the decision of a large shareholder to monitor a firm 
depends critically on his gains from trading with uninformed households.  The households trade 
in response to their own liquidity needs. Their trades, particularly sales, enable the activist to 
camouflage his purchases, i.e., buy shares in the firm at prices that are not fully revealing of his 
intentions.  Once the activist intervenes, these shares increase in price, resulting in trading gains 
that help offset his monitoring costs. Therefore, the larger the liquidity shocks experienced by non-
activist shareholders (mostly institutional investors in the context of activism), the higher the 
activist’s expected trading gains and the larger his incentives to intervene.  This role of uninformed 
                                                             
7 Chen, Hong, and Stein (2008) provide evidence that hedge funds profit from front-running distressed mutual funds.  
Shive and Yun (2013) find that hedge funds profitably trade on predicted mutual fund flows, especially in small and 
illiquid stocks.  Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) infer daily institutional trading from TAQ data and show 
that institutions demand liquidity, especially when they sell. 
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investors’ funding shocks in facilitating the activist’s block formation is shared by all of the above 
liquidity theories, despite their different assumptions and predictions.8  
H1 (Main): The probability of a firm becoming an activist target increases in institutional selling.  
The liquidity theories assume that institutions sell in response to their own funding circumstances 
rather than in response to private information about a target firm or the activist’s accumulation of 
target shares to launch a campaign.  Although institutional selling may be uninformed, it facilitates 
the activist’s block formation in a firm, and hence raises the firm’s probability of being targeted. 
H2 (Timing): Conditional on the activist’s recognizing the benefits of monitoring at a given firm, 
institutional selling accelerates the launch of a campaign. 
The liquidity theories assume that the activist already recognizes the potential improvement in firm 
value as a result of his intervention.  However, he needs additional trading gains to help offset his 
monitoring costs, and institutional selling allows him to obtain these gains.  Thus, institutional 
selling accelerates targeting among firms whose monitoring benefits have been recognized by the 
activist rather than attract attention to unlikely targets.   
H3 (Synchronicity): Target firms experience net institutional selling before campaign 
announcement, and institutional sales and activist purchases are synchronous in time. 
This hypothesis spells out a test of the camouflage mechanism.  To hide his intentions, the activist 
strategically acquires target shares at the same time that other institutions sell so that the net order 
imbalance is close to zero.  This way, the market maker cannot differentiate with certainty between 
informed and uninformed order flows, and set the market price to fully reflect the intervention 
probability. At the daily frequency with continuous trading, we interpret this anonymous order 
batching as synchronicity between institutional sales and activist purchases. 
H4 (Substitution): The synchronicity between institutional sales and activist purchases is lower 
among target firms with higher net benefits from activism. 
The activist relies on the sum of activism benefits (that accrue to his toehold) and trading gains 
(from buying additional target shares at prices that are not fully revealing) to cover his monitoring 
                                                             
8 For example, in Back et al. (2014), the activist is endowed with a block of a random size. They find that if the initial 
block is sufficiently large, liquidity may be harmful for governance as it helps the activist camouflage his sales and 
exit. Though closing their model in a similar way, Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) arrive at the opposite conclusion 
that liquidity improves governance, even in the case where the activist’s initial stake is large. They highlight the role 
of liquidity in improving price informativeness rather than providing camouflage for informed trading. Kahn and 
Winton (1998) focus on how firm characteristics affect the large shareholder’s ex-ante intervention costs and (indirect) 
benefits, and find ambiguous effects of liquidity. 
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costs.  In firms with larger activism benefits, the activist relies less on trading gains and is more 
likely to launch the campaign quickly without waiting for large institutional liquidity shocks 
(assuming that there is a cost of waiting).  Hence, among activist targets, we should observe a 
negative relationship between activism benefits and trading gains, i.e., the two sources of return 
are substitutes.9  We interpret the synchronicity between institutional sales and activist purchases 
as reflecting the activist’s reliance on trading gains.  
The above four hypotheses reflect our interpretation of the liquidity theories and their shared 
economic mechanism.  In Section 5.5, we consider two alternative explanations and discuss our 
hypotheses through their lens: (i) signaling – institutions are privately informed and trade to signal 
to activists that a particular firm needs an intervention (see Attari, Banerjee, and Noe, 2006), or 
(ii) mechanical – the activist demands target shares and institutions simply supply them; that is, 
‘someone buys so someone else must sell’. 
3. Hedge Fund Activism Sample 
The primary dataset used in this paper is a comprehensive list of hedge fund activist campaigns 
from 2000 to 2007.  The data are hand-collected from regulatory filings and supplemented with 
information from SharkRepellent.net, as described in Gantchev (2013).  The main source is 
Schedule 13D, which must be filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by 
any investor who acquires more than 5% of the voting stock of a public company with the intention 
of influencing its operations or management.  The activist sample consists of 1,191 distinct 
campaigns involving 981 unique targets and 130 hedge fund families. 
We merge the activism dataset with the universe of CRSP-Compustat firms to create an annual 
firm-year panel. We count multiple campaigns in the same firm-year as one target observation.  
The full panel consists of 33,919 firm-years, including 755 target-years. Table 1 compares the 
typical target to non-target firms.  All variables are defined in Appendix A and their measurement 
follows closely Brav et al. (2010) and Edmans et al. (2013).  
[Insert Table 1] 
Hedge fund targets in our sample have fundamentals similar to those reported in the activism 
literature.  For example, compared to other CRSP-Compustat firms, the targets are smaller, have 
lower Tobin’s Q, and slightly lower book Leverage.  Typical targets operate in industries that are 
not more or less competitive than those of other firms (as measured by the Herfindahl index of 
                                                             
9 This hypothesis follows from Maug (1998)’s starting assumption that the firm in question is a natural target, i.e. the 
fundamental improvement in firm value as a result of activism is higher than the activist’s monitoring costs.  Therefore, 
our tests focus on the sample of activist targets, for which the above assumption is presumably satisfied. 
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segment sales) and are not poorly performing in terms of return on assets (ROA), even though they 
seem to suffer from lower Sales Growth.  They also have higher analyst following (not statistically 
significant), as measured with data from I/B/E/S.  Finally, hedge funds tend to approach firms with 
large institutional holdings, based on data from Thomson Reuters 13F.   
To investigate the role of institutional trading in the emergence of hedge fund activism, we merge 
the above firm-year panel with institutional trading data.  We measure institutional trading in two 
different ways.  Our first measure aggregates all buy and sell transactions in each firm by all 
institutions reporting to Ancerno (formerly known as the Abel/Noser Corporation).10 Ancerno 
provides transaction cost analysis to mutual funds, pension plan sponsors, and brokers representing 
(on average) 13.47% of total CRSP volume during 2000-2007.  As seen in Table 1, this data 
requirement reduces our universe to 31,374 firm-years and our activism sample to 731 target-
years.  Our second measure calculates changes in mutual fund holdings using data from Thomson 
Reuters Mutual Funds (formerly CDA Spectrum).  We focus on mutual funds since we can use 
mutual fund flows from CRSP to identify funding shocks.  This data requirement further reduces 
our universe to 25,982 firm-years and our activism sample to 636 firm-years. 
Table 1 shows that activist targets see substantially more negative (average quarterly) net 
institutional trading volume (Inst. net volume/SHROUT) in the year before the start of a campaign, 
driven by both lower buying volume (Inst. buy volume/SHROUT) and higher selling volume (Inst. 
sell volume/SHROUT).  We find a similar result using the average change in quarterly mutual fund 
holdings (ΔMF holding/SHROUT).  These summary statistics suggest that institutional trading 
may have an impact on an activist’s decision to target a specific firm. 
Finally, we also merge the firm-year panel data with activist hedge fund holdings from the 13F 
dataset.  61% of targets and 48% of non-targets have at least one activist hedge fund owner (not 
necessarily the activist initiating the campaign) at the beginning of the year.  Moreover, in the 
sample of firms with hedge fund toeholds, we see that more hedge funds have toeholds (No. HFs 
with toehold) in targets than in other firms, with the median toehold (HF toehold/SHROUT) being 
almost six times as large.  
4. Effect of Institutional Trading on Hedge Fund Activism 
The first part of our analysis examines the relationship between institutional trading and activist 
targeting at the annual/quarterly frequency using the full firm-year panel of CRSP-Compustat 
                                                             
10 See Puckett and Yan (2011) for a broad description of the data. Anand et al. (2012) show that Ancerno institutions 
are representative of 13F institutions in terms of the characteristics of their holdings.  
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firms with available trading data.  To aid in the interpretation of our results, we start with a brief 
sketch of the activism process, highlighting the role of institutional trading in target selection.   
We view activist targeting as a three-step screening process. The three steps below are consistent 
with the evidence presented here and in the previous literature but should not be taken literally. 
Step 1: The activist identifies N1 firms that may benefit from activism, given their fundamental 
characteristics and corporate policies, such as leverage, payout, etc.  N1 is likely to be large.  For 
example, we find that hundreds of firms in any given year look like viable targets as they have 
predicted target probabilities11 at least as high as the 25th percentile of the target sample. 
Step 2: The activist identifies N2 < N1 candidates that have sufficient liquidity, considering 
liquidity as a persistent characteristic as in Edmans et al. (2013) and Norli et al. (2014).  N2 is 
likely to still be large, as the univariate statistics in Table 1 suggest that target firms are not much 
more liquid than other firms. 
Step 3: The activist follows N2 target candidates, and ultimately targets N3 << N2 firms whose 
shares experience large institutional sales.  
The literature has shown that the first two steps are important (e.g., Brav et al., 2008, and Edmans 
et al., 2013).  We argue that the third step is also necessary because both fundamentals and stock 
liquidity are persistent12 and therefore the first two steps alone cannot explain why so few firms 
(less than 3% of public firms) are targeted and why they are targeted at a particular time.  Our 
empirical tests aim to justify this argument by referring to the liquidity theories. 
4.1 Does Institutional Trading Affect a Firm’s Likelihood of Becoming a Target? 
We first test hypothesis H1 that the probability of becoming an activist target increases in 
institutional selling.  We do so by estimating linear probability models of activist targeting, with 
institutional trading volumes as the main explanatory variables.  At the end of this subsection, we 
identify the liquidity channel by using flow-induced fire sales and purchases as measures of 
funding shocks. 
The first four columns of Table 2 report OLS estimates.  All models include industry and year 
fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm.  In Column (1), we include as explanatory 
variables only firm characteristics that the extant literature has shown may affect activist targeting 
                                                             
11 This is based on the estimated model in Column (1) of Table 2. 
12 For example, both liquidity measures in Edmans et al. (2013) are highly auto-correlated with Pearson and Spearman 
autocorrelations between 0.85–0.94.  Thus, Edmans et al. (2013) and Norli et al. (2014) effectively rely on the cross 
sectional variation in liquidity to identify its effects on shareholder monitoring.  Other fundamentals are also highly 
auto-correlated (e.g., the autocorrelations of leverage and ROA are 0.87 and 0.58, respectively). 
 9 
(all variables are described in Appendix A). The coefficient estimates of these characteristics are 
largely similar to those previously reported in the literature. For example, targeting is positively 
correlated with liquidity (-log(Amihud)) and institutional ownership but negatively correlated with 
size (log(MV)) and market-to-book (Tobin’s Q). 
[Insert Table 2]  
Columns (2) and (3) add institutional trading volumes from Ancerno, calculated as the quarterly 
averages for each firm-year as a percent of shares outstanding (SHROUT).  Column (2) shows that 
net (buy minus sell) institutional volume has a negative effect (significant at 1%) on the probability 
of being targeted.  Column (3) separates institutional selling and buying volumes. We find that a 
one standard deviation increase in institutional selling volume is associated with a 0.45% (0.034 x 
0.135) increase in the probability of becoming an activist target whereas a one standard deviation 
increase in institutional buying volume is related to a 0.70% (0.038 x -0.185) decrease in that 
probability.  Both effects are statistically significant at 1% and economically significant, given that 
the unconditional probability of becoming an activist target is 2.33%.  The effects of institutional 
trading on activist targeting are distinct from those of firm characteristics, including corporate 
policies, valuation as proxied by Tobin’s Q and previous year’s stock return, as well as general 
stock liquidity as measured by average Amihud ratio.  
In Column (4), we use an alternative measure of institutional trading calculated as the change in 
mutual fund holdings as a percent of shares outstanding.  This variable is the quarterly average in 
a given firm-year of the change in the holdings of all mutual funds in the Thomson Reuters Mutual 
Funds data.  We find that a one standard deviation increase in mutual fund holdings decreases the 
probability of being targeted by 0.78% (0.009 x -0.868). 
To establish that institutional selling affects the activist’s targeting decision through the liquidity 
channel, we use fire-sale based instrumental variables in the spirit of Coval and Stafford (2007). 
Our instruments extract the institutions’ trades that are driven by institution-specific funding 
constraints and therefore likely exogenous to the activism events.13  In particular, we follow the 
approach in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) and instrument the change in mutual fund 
holdings by expected fire sales and purchases.  The expected fire sales (purchases) for each 
individual mutual fund in each reporting quarter are the product of the percentage outflows 
(inflows) and the beginning-of-quarter share holdings if the fund experiences flows that are larger 
than 5% in magnitude; otherwise, the expected fire sales (purchases) are zero.  We then sum the 
expected fire sales and purchases across all mutual funds holding each stock, divide the sum by 
the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the quarter, and average across all quarters 
                                                             
13 Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012) among others confirm that flow-induced trades by mutual funds are 
largely uninformed. 
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to obtain the expected fire sales and purchases for each firm-year.   
We estimate our model using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) since as 
demonstrated by Stock and Yogo (2005), LIML has essentially zero maximal relative bias (worst-
case asymptotic bias greater than some threshold) and its maximal size distortion (worst-case false 
rejection of the null in small samples) is generally less than that of 2SLS.  We report the first- and 
second-stage results in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2, respectively.14  These results confirm that 
a plausibly exogenous increase in mutual fund holdings reduces the probability of a firm being 
targeted in an activist campaign.  Thus, a firm experiencing fire sales (purchases) is more (less) 
likely to be targeted, which establishes support for the liquidity channel.  As a robustness check, 
in the Internet Appendix, we confirm this result with an alternative version of the instruments 
constructed using daily institutional transaction data from Ancerno.  As described in detail in the 
Internet Appendix, we identify each institution’s liquidity trades in a generic firm’s stock by its 
trading in other stocks outside the firm’s industry.  
4.2 Does Trading Accelerate Activist Targeting? 
In this subsection, we test the Timing hypothesis (H2) that institutional selling accelerates the start 
of a campaign at firms whose potential benefits from activism have already been recognized by 
activists.  We take the first acquisition of a toehold by any known activism-focused hedge fund 
(not necessarily the one that initiates a campaign) as a proxy for the recognition that a particular 
firm may benefit from monitoring.  We define activism-focused hedge funds as those that launch 
more than the median number of campaigns (5) during our sample period.  Since these hedge funds 
primarily engage in activism, their toeholds are unlikely to reflect other unrelated investment 
objectives.  Below, we use an illustrative timeline of activist targeting to map the first arrival of an 
activist at time t = 1, before which the firm’s potential activism benefits have not been recognized.  
At t = 2, an activist targets the firm.  In this framework, the Timing hypothesis would predict that 
institutional selling shortens the time between t = 1 and t = 2, i.e., increases the arrival rate of a 
campaign, conditional on some activists already having a toehold.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 Our instruments are statistically valid, comfortably passing the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald test (see Stock and 
Yogo, 2005) as well as the test of overidentifying restrictions (based on Hansen’s J statistic) implying that they are 
generally orthogonal to the second-stage errors. 
t = 0 
Become 
exposed to 
risk of toehold 
acquisition. 
t = 1 
Observe first 
activism-
focused hedge 
fund toehold. 
t = 2 
Become 
activist 
target. 
Timeline 
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We estimate discrete-time proportional hazard models for activist targeting (starting at t = 1 and 
ending at t = 2), and report the coefficients in Panel A of Table 3. Each observation is a firm-
quarter.  All specifications include firm controls and four types of fixed effects: (i) survival 
duration (in quarters) fixed effects to control for the length of time a firm has survived and absorb 
the baseline hazard rates, (ii) vintage fixed effects to absorb any regularities associated with the 
quarter in which a firm enters the sample, (iii) calendar year-quarter fixed effects to control for 
cyclicality in activism (Burkart and Dasgupta, 2014), and (iv) industry fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The dependent variable is a “target” dummy, which equals one in the quarter in which a firm is 
targeted, and zero otherwise.  For a given firm, the spell begins when an activism-focused hedge 
fund acquires a toehold for the first time (i.e., when the firm is first viewed as a target candidate), 
and completes when it is targeted.  Thus, the sample includes only firms in which at least one 
activism-focused hedge fund has a toehold and tracks these firms until they get targeted or until 
they are right-censored at the end of our sample.  Firms with existing activist toeholds at the 
beginning of the sample period in 2000 suffer from left censorship, which we correct using two 
approaches – Correction 1 sets the beginning of a left-censored spell to the later of the date on 
which we observe an activist toehold or 1994Q115, whereas Correction 2 simply drops all left-
censored spells.16 
The results in Column (1) show that institutional net volume negatively affects the arrival rate of 
an activist campaign.  Column (2) includes separately institutional selling and buying volumes and 
confirms our findings – institutional sell (buy) volume is positively (negatively) associated with 
the arrival rate of a campaign.  These results are all statistically significant at 1%, and robust to 
changes in the correction for left-censorship, as illustrated in Columns (3) and (4).  The average 
unconditional hazard rate of 0.006 implies that in about 11.79 years, a quarter of the firms with 
activist toeholds will be targeted.17  From this baseline, the estimates in Column (2) suggest that a 
one standard deviation increase in institutional selling (buying) volume decreases (increases) the 
average hazard rate by about 25%, effectively reducing (extending) the time in which a quarter of 
the firms will be targeted by about 2.35 years.18  
Our timing results have broad implications for the “scale” of activism.  Given that activists have 
                                                             
15 The 1994Q1 cutoff is imposed because hedge fund activism in its current form only took off at that time due to a 
change in the regulation of proxy communications.   
16 Dropping left-censored spells can incur a substantial loss of power but yields asymptotically consistent estimates, 
and is very common in practice, as discussed by Allison (2010) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008).   
17 This is a static interpretation of the hazard probability, which assumes that a firm experiences a similar level of 
institutional trading in every quarter. 
18 These statistics should not be interpreted as the time it takes to accumulate an activist block because the first toehold 
acquisition and the campaign launch are often by different activists. 
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toeholds in many firms but end up launching campaigns in very few of them (<1% in each quarter), 
the evidence suggests that one should interpret institutional selling as determining in which of the 
candidate firms the activist can build a block without revealing his intentions.  Thus, institutional 
selling affects the number of viable targets and the scale of activism. 
Alternatively, institutional trading may also inform the activist that a particular firm needs an 
intervention.  For example, in the model of Attari et al. (2006), institutions receive a signal and 
will sell the firm’s shares only if the signal is low (i.e., activism is beneficial), or at least 
uninformative.  Observing the order flow and the market-clearing price, the activist then decides 
whether to buy shares and become active, which is more likely following the noisy signal provided 
by institutional sales.  To the extent that a toehold reflects the activist’s recognition of monitoring 
benefits, we then should observe that institutional sales accelerate the first acquisition of an activist 
toehold, i.e., shortens the time between t = 0 and t = 1.  Panel B of Table 3 tests this prediction. 
The dependent variable is a “recognition” dummy, which equals one in the quarter in which at 
least one known activism-focused hedge fund acquires a toehold in a firm, and zero otherwise.  
For a given firm, the spell starts at t = 0, when the firm becomes exposed to the risk of a toehold 
acquisition (defined as the time when the firm’s shares become publicly tradable and can be 
purchased by a hedge fund), and ends at t = 1, when at least one activist has a toehold in the firm 
(i.e., the spell is complete) or when the sample ends (i.e., the spell is right-censored), whichever 
comes first.  Firms that already exist but are without any activism-focused hedge fund toeholds at 
the beginning of the sample period suffer from left censorship, which is corrected by the two 
approaches described earlier. 
Column (1) shows that institutional net trading has a marginal effect on the arrival rate of the first 
activist.  This effect turns statistically insignificant in Column (3) and is economically weak, driven 
by institutional buy volume, as seen in Column (2).  The unconditional average hazard rate of 
0.060 implies that 50% of firms will see an acquisition by at least one known activist hedge fund 
within about 2.89 years.  The estimates in Column (2) suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in institutional buy volume increases the average hazard rate by just 6.83%, reducing the 
time in which 50% of firms will see an activist toehold by about 0.19 years.  This result implies 
that an activist is more likely to acquire a position in a given firm when other institutions also 
purchase (rather than sell) shares of that firm, inconsistent with the overall relationship in Table 2.  
The first activist acquisition is likely driven by an informational event rather than the mechanism 
we describe in this paper whereby institutional selling creates favorable market conditions for the 
accumulation of an activist stake. 
To address endogeneity concerns, we perform an IV-2SLS analysis in Table IA.III in the Internet 
 13 
Appendix, using our instrumental variables based on institutional funding shocks.19  Our IV results 
confirm the Timing hypothesis. 
5. Effect of Institutional Trading on Hedge Fund Purchases of Target Shares 
In this section, we zoom in at the daily frequency on the hedge fund’s accumulation of target shares 
and investigate whether the mechanism by which institutional sales facilitate the activist’s block 
formation is indeed as described by the liquidity theories.  Specifically, we test two central but 
untested premises of the liquidity theories – synchronicity between institutional sales and hedge 
fund purchases, and substitution between activism benefits and trading gains in the activist’s 
targeting decision.   
5.1 How Do Hedge Funds and Other Institutions Trade Target Stocks? 
As part of Schedule 13D, the activist is required to report all transactions in the target’s stock in 
the 60 days before the campaign announcement (file date).20  For about two-thirds of our sample 
of activism events, we are able to hand-collect the hedge fund transaction history, including the 
date of each transaction, the number of shares purchased or sold, the price per share and the type 
of each transaction (open market, private or other).21 After matching to institutional trading data 
from Ancerno, our activism sample contains 643 campaigns.  
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the trading in targets by activist hedge funds.  Activists trade 
mostly in the open market (97.51% of all transactions) and account for an average of 15.78% of 
the total CRSP volume in the target’s shares.  Most strikingly, the average activist purchases 4.25% 
of the target’s outstanding shares in the 60 days before filing, representing 61.89% of his total 
ownership on the file date.22 On the event date, the activist acquires, on average, over 1% of the 
target’s outstanding shares, representing 41.24% of the target’s total market volume. In addition, 
hedge funds continue to purchase shares after crossing the 5% threshold and accumulate another 
1.28% of outstanding shares until the file date. 
 [Insert Table 4] 
                                                             
19 We also perform a reduced-form analysis by simply replacing the potentially endogenous institutional trading 
variables by their corresponding instruments.  The highly non-linear nature of our proportional hazard models renders 
usual IV estimation methods inefficient and hard to interpret due to the unknown true functional form of the first-
stage equation.  We are comforted by the fact that both the IV and reduced-form results provide consistent support for 
the Timing hypothesis. 
20 An investor is allowed up to 10 days after crossing the 5% ownership threshold to report his activist intentions. 
21 The remaining campaigns do not provide transaction data because of previous Schedule 13G filings, missing share 
or price information, etc. The 13G filing is a passive version of the 13D filing and does not allow activist practices. 
22 Figure IA.2 in the Internet Appendix shows the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of target stocks in the 
240 days leading up to the start of a campaign and documents a significant price run-up before the campaign. 
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Panel B of Table 4 reports the trading of Ancerno institutions, which sell a net of 2.52% of the 
average target’s outstanding shares in the 240 days before the activist’s filing.  Most of this selling 
(1.50% of shares outstanding, or 14.36% of the target’s market volume) occurs in the 60 days 
immediately before the campaign. On the event date, institutions sell a net of 0.34% of the target’s 
outstanding shares.23 On that single day, activists and Ancerno institutions account for 61.59% of 
the target’s market volume, suggesting that these two market players likely trade (indirectly) with 
each other.  Figure 1 plots the mean cumulative ownership of activist hedge funds and Ancerno 
institutions in the year before the announcement of activism. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
The mean number of selling institutions exceeds the mean number of buying institutions in all 
event periods.24 For most campaigns, only one or two institutions are responsible for most event-
date trading, and only a handful account for most trading in the prior months (see Table IA.IV in 
the Internet Appendix).  We interpret this as evidence that institutional trading is largely driven by 
institution-specific rather than target-specific circumstances. 
5.2 Institutional Trading and Activist Purchases of Target Shares 
In this subsection, we investigate the daily synchronicity between institutional trading and hedge 
fund purchases in the period before the hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 5% threshold.  We 
start with Figure 2, which shows that the trading of hedge funds and other institutions is highly 
synchronized at the daily frequency (the correlation coefficient is -0.94). This pattern is widespread 
among the campaigns in our sample (see Figure IA.3 in the Internet Appendix), suggesting that it 
may not be coincidental. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Table 5 reports OLS regressions of daily net hedge fund volume on institutional net (sell and buy) 
volume(s).  Each observation is a campaign-day (i.e., each trading day in one campaign counts as 
one observation).  As general market controls, we include the daily CRSP value-weighted return, 
VIX25, and target share turnover26.  We also control for the effects of general liquidity by including 
in some specifications five lags of the target’s abnormal Amihud ratio, calculated by the mean-
adjustment approach (the estimation period is from t-600 to t-240).  To absorb potential 
confounding effects of the target’s valuation, we also include five lags of the target’s abnormal 
                                                             
23 The mean (median) of the ratio of institutional sales to hedge fund purchases on the event date is 1.41 (0.44) (these 
statistics are 1.33 (0.39) for the 60 days before the event date). 
24 We conservatively define an institution as the unique combination of Ancerno client and client manager codes. 
25 Nagel (2012) uses a reversal strategy to proxy for the returns from liquidity provision and shows that the time 
variation in this strategy can be predicted with the VIX index. 
26 To avoid collinearity, we adjust turnover by subtracting total hedge fund volume and institutional buy/sell volumes. 
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returns, calculated by the market-model adjustment approach using the CRSP value-weighted 
index as the market portfolio.  We cluster standard errors by campaign.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Column (1) shows that hedge funds acquire more target shares on days with more negative 
institutional net volume.  A 1% decrease in institutional net volume (as a percentage of shares 
outstanding) increases net hedge fund volume by 0.17% (statistically significant at 1%).  Column 
(2) reports separately the effects of institutional selling and buying volumes, showing that the 
negative correlation between net institutional and hedge fund trading is largely driven by 
institutional selling, whose coefficient is statistically significant at 1% and highly economically 
significant.  A 1% increase in institutional selling volume raises net hedge fund volume by 0.26%. 
The coefficient on institutional buying volume is close to zero and statistically insignificant.27  
Turnover is positive and significant, implying that activist hedge funds tend to buy more on days 
with high volume (and potentially high liquidity, as shown by Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015).  
Columns (3) and (4) confirm these results after the inclusion of five lags of net hedge fund volume, 
abnormal return, and abnormal Amihud ratio.  
Columns (1)-(4) include campaign dummies to absorb time-invariant characteristics specific to 
each target.  To ensure that our results are not biased due to possible correlation between the lags 
of net hedge fund volume and the error terms (Arellano and Bond, 1991)28, in Columns (5) and 
(6), we repeat the analysis by using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), cumulative abnormal 
turnover (CAT), and cumulative abnormal Amihud ratio (CAA) in the period from t-240 to t-60 
as campaign-level controls.  The results suggest that the bias, if any, is minimal; institutional net 
(sell) volume remains significant at 1%, with largely unchanged coefficient magnitude.  The 
coefficient on institutional buy volume remains close to zero.  Overall, our results show that hedge 
fund purchases and institutional sales are synchronous at the daily frequency, consistent with the 
camouflage mechanism posited by the liquidity theories.  In the next subsection, we formally test 
the Synchronicity hypothesis (H3) by identifying institutional trades that are plausibly induced by 
liquidity shocks. 
5.3 Identifying the Liquidity Channel using Daily Institutional Funding Shocks 
We identify the liquidity channel by extracting the institutions’ trading in a target that is driven by 
                                                             
27 We further investigate the effects of institutional selling and buying volumes on activist purchases by estimating 
several piecewise linear specifications. While the effects of institutional selling volume are significantly positive in 
all ranges, the effects of institutional buying volumes are negative (though mostly insignificant) at volumes below the 
60th percentile (0.03% of shares outstanding) and turn to zero in the higher ranges.  Therefore, our linear specifications 
show largely zero coefficients on institutional buying volume. 
28 This problem is severe in settings with a very small number of time-series observations, which is not the case here 
because we use a daily firm panel with about 60 observations per firm. 
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institution-specific funding needs.  Below, we justify our measures of liquidity trades and outline 
a broad set of steps to calculate them.  Additional details are in the Internet Appendix. 
We identify the liquidity trades of each institution in a generic firm’s stock using its trading in 
other stocks outside the firm’s industry.  The intuition is similar to the use of extreme mutual fund 
flows to isolate valuation changes that may drive some endogenous events, such as mergers, but 
are unrelated to firm fundamentals and hence plausibly exogenous to the events.  As shown by 
Coval and Stafford (2007) and others, an institution experiencing large inflows (outflows) often 
scales its existing stock positions proportionally up (down).  Thus, if an institution trades in 
response to changes in its funding, we should see that it trades most stocks in the same direction 
and its trading in one stock should be positively related to its trading in others.  Since we do not 
have daily flow data, we infer an institution’s funding changes by studying its trading behavior 
across a large set of stocks.   
We start by confirming the fire-sale trading patterns in our daily data. Figure IA.4 in the Internet 
Appendix shows that an institution is more (less) likely to sell (buy) a stock when its fraction of 
other stocks sold is higher.  Motivated by this pattern, we proceed to calculate firm-day expected 
institutional buy and sell volumes in the following steps. First, in Table IA.VI, we estimate the 
probabilities that each individual institution will buy or sell a generic firm’s stock as a function of 
its trading in other stocks outside the generic firm’s industry.  We use all stocks, not just targets, 
in our estimation to ensure that we capture the general patterns of trading due to each institution’s 
funding circumstances; hence, our estimates are not biased by the ex-post classification of stocks 
into targets and non-targets. 
Then, we use the estimated probabilities that institution i will buy or sell target stock j on day t 
(𝑃𝑟#$𝑏𝑢𝑦(,*+ or 𝑃𝑟#$𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙(,*+) and multiply them by the institution’s conditional average trade size 
per day to obtain its expected buying and selling volumes:  
𝐸#$𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(,*+ = 𝑃𝑟#$𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(,*+ × 𝐸#$𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(|𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(+,  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 ∈ {𝑏𝑢𝑦, 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙}. 
Finally, we sum the above expected buying and selling volumes across all N institutions to get the 
expected total buying and selling volumes in stock j on day t: 
𝐸$𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(,*+ = ∑ 𝐸#$𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(,*+>#?@ ,  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 ∈ {𝑏𝑢𝑦, 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙}. 
We argue that our instruments are likely exogenous to a model of hedge fund purchases.  First, the 
expected volumes reflect institution-specific funding circumstances and trading characteristics, 
unrelated to any particular stock and by extension not driven by the impending activist campaign. 
Second, we address concerns about omitted variable bias by controlling for common drivers of the 
institutions’ funding shocks and the hedge funds’ trades at the economy, industry, and firm levels. 
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We also absorb low-frequency variation in economic conditions by using campaign fixed effects 
in the models of hedge fund purchases (each campaign spans about 60 days).  Finally, by 
construction, our instruments operate independently from any industry-specific conditions that 
may drive away institutions but attract hedge funds.   
More generally, in the Internet Appendix, we present additional order-level evidence that 
characterizes the institutions’ trading behavior and transaction costs in different periods around 
the activism events.  In Table IA.VIII, we show that institutions trade target and non-target stocks 
in virtually the same manner.  In Table IA.IX, we demonstrate that institutions demand liquidity 
when selling both target and non-target stocks whereas hedge funds appear to provide liquidity in 
the targets during the 60 days leading up to the campaign and on the event date.  Thus, institutional 
trading in the target firms does not seem to be driven by target-specific information or by hedge 
fund trading, and hence is likely exogenous to activism. 
We now formally test the Synchronicity hypothesis (H3), using expected institutional buying and 
selling volumes as instruments to identify the institutions’ liquidity trades.  Table 6 reports 
instrumental variables (IV-LIML) estimates of the models in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.  
Columns (1) and (3)-(4) present the first-stage results relating the endogenous regressors – 
institutional net (sell and buy) volume(s) – to the instruments, and Columns (2) and (5) report the 
second-stage results predicting net hedge fund volume as a function of the endogenous 
regressors.29  We control for the CRSP value-weighted return, VIX, adjusted turnover, and five 
lags of the target’s abnormal return and Amihud ratio, and include campaign fixed effects. We 
cluster standard errors by campaign and adjust them for errors in constructing the instruments. 
[Insert Table 6] 
The first-stage estimates in Column (1) show that actual institutional net volume significantly loads 
on both expected institutional buy and sell volumes.  Intuitively, actual net volume decreases in 
expected sell volume and increases in expected buy volume.  Columns (3) and (4) confirm these 
relationships.  For example, Column (3) shows that actual institutional selling volume is 
significantly positively correlated with expected institutional selling volume.  Even though the 
coefficient on expected buy volume is also positive and significant, its magnitude is only a quarter 
of the magnitude of the coefficient on expected institutional selling.  Thus, within the variation of 
actual institutional buys and sells explained by our model, it is largely the expected buys that drive 
actual buys and the expected sells that drive actual sells.  
The second-stage regressions in Columns (2) and (5) show that institutional trading volumes have 
                                                             
29 All specifications pass the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald test, indicating that our instruments sufficiently explain the 
variation in the endogenous regressors and hence are relevant.  In addition, the overidentified models in Columns (1) 
and (2) pass the test of overidentifying restrictions (based on Hansen’s J statistic) at conventional levels. 
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a statistically significant effect on net hedge fund volume.  Column (2) shows that hedge fund 
purchases significantly decrease in institutional net volume.  Separating institutional buy and sell 
volumes in Column (5), we see that it is the selling rather than the buying that drives the liquidity 
effects; institutional selling raises hedge fund purchases, consistent with the Synchronicity 
hypothesis.  Our instruments, based on each institution’s funding circumstances, confirm that the 
associations we show in Table 5 are indeed driven by the liquidity channel.   
5.4 Substitution between Activism Benefits and Trading Gains 
In this subsection, we test the Substitution hypothesis (H4), which states that the synchronicity 
between institutional sales and activist purchases is lower among targets with higher expected 
activism benefits.  To do so, we propose two measures of potential activism benefits.  Our first 
measure is a firm’s predicted probability of being targeted (baseline target probability), which is 
a linear combination of observable fundamentals and policies, including leverage, payout, ROA, 
etc., shown by the literature to affect targeting.  To the extent that targets are chosen on the basis 
of their expected activism benefits, the baseline target probability should capture these benefits.  
Our second measure is the sum of all toeholds in a target by known activist hedge funds before a 
campaign launch.  We use this alternative proxy to capture unobserved determinants of activism 
benefits, which by construction are not reflected in the baseline target probability.  The idea is to 
exploit “revealed preference” – activist hedge funds are attracted to firms that are likely to benefit 
from activism, and their toeholds reflect this attraction.  Firms with higher potential benefits draw 
a larger number of activist hedge funds, each with a larger toehold. 
Table 7 reports OLS regressions of daily net hedge fund volume on institutional net volume by 
level of activism benefits.  All specifications control for but do not report (for brevity) the CRSP 
value-weighted return, VIX, adjusted turnover, five lags of abnormal return and abnormal Amihud 
ratio, and five lags of net hedge fund volume.  We also include campaign fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors by campaign. In Panel A, we rely on our first measure of expected activism benefits 
– baseline target probability, calculated using the specification in Column (1) of Table 2, with size 
and institutional ownership set to their sample means as they may be correlated with liquidity and 
institutional trading. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Columns (1) and (2) split activist targets into those with below and above median baseline target 
probabilities, respectively.  Consistent with the Substitution hypothesis, the effects of institutional 
net volume on hedge fund purchases are greater in Column (1) than in Column (2).  A 1% decrease 
in institutional net volume increases net hedge fund volume (as a percent of shares outstanding) 
by 0.20% in the sample with below median baseline target probability but by only 0.10% in the 
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sample with above median baseline target probability.  The difference is statistically significant at 
5%, as indicated by the coefficient of the interaction term between institutional net volume and a 
dummy for above median baseline target probability in Column (3).  As a robustness check, in 
Column (4), we interact institutional net volume directly with baseline target probability.  The 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at 1%.  
Panel B measures potential benefits from activism by the combined total toehold in a target of all 
known activist hedge funds.30 We match 61% of the targets to hedge fund holdings from the 13F 
database and use the hedge funds’ toeholds in the most recent quarter before a campaign.  To avoid 
potential mechanical relationships, we sum the toeholds across all hedge funds, excluding the 
hedge fund that launches the campaign.  Columns (1)-(3) split the activist targets into three 
subsamples – those with zero total hedge fund toehold (Column (1)) and those with below/above 
median (non-zero) total hedge fund toehold (Columns (2) and (3), respectively).  
Consistent with the Substitution hypothesis, we find that the effects of institutional net volume on 
hedge fund purchases decrease in the total hedge fund toehold.  Column (1) shows that for targets 
in which no hedge funds (other than the activist) hold a stake, institutional net volume has the 
largest negative effects on net hedge fund volume.  These effects decline monotonically in 
Columns (2) and (3) for the targets with below and above median (non-zero) total hedge fund 
toeholds.  In Column (4), we test the difference between the effects of institutional net volume in 
targets with below (Columns (1)-(2)) and above median (Column (3)) activism benefits by 
interacting institutional net volume with a dummy for above median total hedge fund toehold.  The 
coefficients of the main and interaction terms show that a 1% decrease in institutional net volume 
increases net hedge fund volume by 0.22% in the sample with low activism benefits but by only 
0.11% in the sample with high benefits. In Column (5), we confirm our earlier findings by 
interacting institutional net volume with total hedge fund toehold. 
In Table IA.VII in the Internet Appendix, we test the Substitution hypothesis again using our 
instrumental variables based on institutional funding shocks. The IV-LIML results confirm that 
the liquidity theories are indeed at work.   
5.5 Discussion of Alternative Explanations 
In this subsection, we consider two alternative explanations for the positive relationship between 
institutional selling and hedge fund activism.  First, the signaling theories argue that institutions 
may be informed and trade to signal to activists that a particular firm needs an intervention (see 
Attari et al., 2006, for a dynamic model of this mechanism).  Second, the mechanical explanation 
                                                             
30 On average, activist hedge funds hold about 135 different stocks on each report date and intervene in only 0.7% 
within the following 6 months, 1.0% within the following year, and 1.5% within the following three years.   
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posits that the activist demands target shares and institutions simply supply them; that is, ‘someone 
buys so someone else must sell’. Before proceeding, we note that our analysis of these explanations 
is not geared towards accepting or rejecting them; our goal is simply to ensure that our main 
findings are robust to these alternatives. 
Our main hypothesis that institutional trading raises a firm’s probability of becoming an activist 
target is consistent with all three alternatives (including the liquidity theories).  The difference 
among these alternatives lies in the nature of institution trading.  Under the mechanical 
explanation, causality flows from the activist’s targeting to institutional selling.  As the activist 
assembles a block, he demands target shares and institutions respond by supplying them, thus 
generating a positive correlation between institutional selling and targeting.  In contrast, under the 
signaling and liquidity theories, causality flows from institutional selling to the activist’s targeting.  
The two theories, however, posit a different nature of institutional trading.  The signaling theories 
assume that informed institutions sell with the intention to induce activism whereas the liquidity 
theories assume that uninformed institutions sell in response to their funding shocks.  Our 
instrumental variable analysis in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 identifies the liquidity explanation 
from the mechanical and signaling alternatives.  
On our second hypothesis, Timing, we find that institutional sales accelerate the start of a campaign 
at firms whose monitoring benefits have been recognized by activists (Panel A of Table 3) rather 
than attract attention to firms that appear to be outside the activists’ radar screen (Panel B) as 
predicted by the signaling theories.  Our third hypothesis, Synchronicity, is consistent with both 
the liquidity theories and the mechanical alternative (but not signaling).  However, under the 
mechanical explanation, the activist either purchases from institutions or creates favorable 
conditions for institutions to sell.  In contrast, the liquidity theories posit that it is rather the 
institutional sales that draw the activist’s purchases.  In Table 6, we identify the liquidity trades of 
each institution using its trading in other stocks outside the firm’s industry, and show that causality 
flows from institutional selling to activist purchases, consistent with the liquidity channel.   
Finally, our last hypothesis, Substitution, is not consistent with the signaling and mechanical 
explanations.  Although the signaling mechanism may operate more strongly among firms with 
smaller potential activism benefits (assuming that these benefits are more difficult to recognize), 
it is unlikely to result in higher synchronicity between institutional sales and hedge fund purchases.  
Under signaling, institutional sales should lead hedge fund purchases as hedge funds learn from 
the market-clearing price.  The mechanical explanation does not predict any variation in 
synchronicity in relation to expected activism benefits. 
Overall, our tests confirm that the documented patterns of institutional selling and activist targeting 
are largely driven by the liquidity channel. 
 21 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of institutional trading on an activist’s decision to acquire 
shares in a target firm and initiate a campaign.  We find that institutional selling is positively 
associated with a firm’s probability of being targeted.  Our various analyses of activist targeting 
and daily share accumulation all lead to the conclusion that a liquidity channel is at work: 
(uninformed) institutional selling provides camouflage for (informed) activist purchases, allowing 
the activist to quickly accumulate target shares and gain on these shares once he makes his 
intentions public.  These trading gains help cover the activist’s monitoring costs, making a 
campaign financially viable. 
We identify the liquidity channel by extracting institutional trades that are driven by institution-
specific funding shocks and thus likely exogenous to the activism events.  We also appeal to the 
liquidity channel’s postulated economic mechanism that is distinct from those of alternative 
explanations.  First, we demonstrate that institutional sales accelerate the launch of a campaign at 
firms whose potential benefits from monitoring have already been recognized by activists rather 
than bring attention to firms that are outside the activists’ radar screen.  Second, we show that 
institutional sales and activist purchases are highly synchronous at the daily frequency, and that 
this synchronicity is lower among targets with higher expected activism benefits.  This evidence 
is consistent with the liquidity channel’s central ideas that the activist camouflages his purchases 
among other investors’ liquidity trades, and that the trading gains derived from such camouflage 
are less critical if the expected benefits that accrue to the activist’s initial stake are already large. 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Firm-Year and Firm-Quarter Panels 
Variable Definition 
Dividend yield Common plus preferred dividends divided by market value of common plus 
preferred stocks.  Source: Compustat. 
Exp[inst. buy (sell) 
volume]/SHROUT 
Expected buy (sell) volume as a percentage of shares outstanding.  Calculation at the 
quarterly/annual frequency is as follows: First, the expected weekly buy (sell) volume 
is calculated by multiplying each institution’s predicted probability of buying 
(selling) a given firm by the institution’s average volume and then summing the 
product across all institutions in each week.  Second, the expected buy (sell) volume 
for each firm-quarter is obtained by taking the 90th percentile of the expected weekly 
buy (sell) volume within a quarter.  Third, the expected buy (sell) volume for each 
firm-year is the maximum of the expected quarterly buy (sell) volume within the 
year.  More details are in the Internet Appendix.  Source: CRSP and Ancerno. 
Exp[MF fire purchases 
(sales)]/SHROUT 
Expected mutual funds’ fire purchases (sales) as a percentage of shares outstanding.  
Calculation is as follows:  First, the expected fire purchases (sales) for each 
individual mutual fund in each reporting quarter are calculated as the product of 
percentage inflows (outflows) and the beginning-of-quarter shareholdings if the 
flows are larger than 5% in magnitude; otherwise, the expected fire purchases (sales) 
are zero.  Second, these expected fire purchases (sales) are summed across all 
mutual funds holding each firm, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the quarter, and averaged across all quarters to obtain the expected fire 
purchases (sales) for each firm-year.  Source: CRSP and Thomson Reuters. 
HF toehold/SHROUT Total ownership in a firm of all known activist hedge funds that file Schedule 13F at 
the end of the preceding year.  Source: Thomson Reuters. 
Herfindahl index Herfindahl index of market concentration for each Fama-French 12 industry. 
Inst buy (sell) 
volume/SHROUT 
Annual average of cumulative quarterly institutional buy (sell) volume as a 
percentage of shares outstanding.  Source: Ancerno. 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT Inst. buy volume/SHROUT minus Inst. sell volume/SHROUT  
Inst. ownership Total ownership of institutions that file 13F reports as a percentage of shares 
outstanding.  Source: Thomson Reuters. 
Leverage Book value of debt divided by book value of total assets.  Source: Compustat. 
-log(Amihud) Negative of natural logarithm of one plus Amihud ratio, calculated as yearly average 
of [1000* SQRT(|Daily Return| /(Daily Dollar Trading Volume))].  Daily ratios are 
capped at 30% before averaging, as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Source: CRSP. 
log(Analysts) Natural logarithm of one plus number of analysts following the firm over the 
preceding year. Source: I/B/E/S. 
log(MV) Natural logarithm of market capitalization.  Source: Compustat. 
ΔMF holdings/SHROUT Annual average of quarterly change in ownership of all mutual funds.  Source: 
Thomson Reuters. 
No. HFs with toehold Number of known activist hedge funds reporting an ownership stake in a firm 
through Schedule 13F.  Source: Thomson Reuters. 
R&D/Assets Research and development expense divided by lagged book value of assets. Missing 
= 0.  Source: Compustat. 
Return Stock return, including dividends, over the preceding year.  Source: CRSP. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by lagged book value of assets.  
Source: Compustat. 
Sales growth Sales less lagged sales divided by lagged sales.  Source: Compustat. 
Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of total assets.  
Source: Compustat. 
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Firm-Day, Campaign-Day, and Institution-Firm-Day Panels 
Variable Definition 
Abnormal Amihud ratio and 
Cumulative abnormal 
Amihud ratio (CAA) 
Mean-adjusted Amihud ratio, calculated as  |Daily Return|/(Daily Dollar Trading 
Volume).  The estimation period is from t-600 to t-240.  CAA is calculated as the 
sum of abnormal Amihud ratios during the period from t-240 to t-60. Source: CRSP. 
Abnormal return and 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) 
Market-model-adjusted return.  CRSP value-weighted index is used as the market 
portfolio and the estimation period is t-600 to t-240.  CAR is calculated as the sum of 
abnormal return during the period from t-240 to t-60.  Source: CRSP. 
Abnormal turnover and 
Cumulative abnormal 
turnover (CAT)  
Mean-adjusted turnover, calculated as trading volume divided by shares outstanding.  
The estimation period is from t-600 to t-240.  CAT is calculated as the sum of 
abnormal turnover during the period from t-240 to t-60.  Source: CRSP. 
Adjusted turnover Total trading volume minus the sum of hedge fund activist’s and institutional trading 
volumes, divided by shares outstanding.  Source: CRSP, Schedule 13D, and Ancerno. 
Campaign dummies Set of dummy variables, each equal to one for each individual campaign. 
CRSP value-weighted return Daily return, including all distributions, of CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. 
Dummy[buy (sell)] Dummy variable equal to one if the institution buys (sells) the firm’s stock on the 
day.  Source: Ancerno. 
Dummy[trade only one 
other stock] 
Dummy variable equal to one if the institution buys or sells only one other stock 
outside the firm’s SIC-2 industry on the day.  Source: Ancerno. 
Dummy[trade other stocks] Dummy variable equal to one if the institution buys or sells other stocks outside the 
firm’s SIC-2 industry on the day.  Source: Ancerno. 
Exp[inst. buy (sell) 
volume]/SHROUT 
Expected buy (sell) volume as a percentage of shares outstanding, calculated by 
multiplying each institution’s predicted probability of buying (selling) the firm’s 
stock by the institution’s average volume and then summing the product across all 
institutions.  More details are in the Internet Appendix.  Source: CRSP and Ancerno. 
Fraction of trading days 
during sample 
Number of days on which the institution trades at least one stock divided by total 
number of days during the sample period.  Source: Ancerno. 
Fraction of sell principal Dollar principal of all other stocks sold divided by total dollar principal of all stocks 
bought and sold.  Only other stocks outside the firm’s SIC-2 industry are included in 
the calculation.  Source: Ancerno. 
Fraction of stocks sold Number of individual stocks (not shares) sold divided by total number of individual 
stocks bought or sold.  Only other stocks outside the firm’s SIC-2 industry are 
included in the calculation.  Source: Ancerno. 
Inst. buy (sell) 
volume/SHROUT 
Total daily institutional buy (sell) volume as a percentage of shares outstanding.  
Source: Ancerno. 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT Inst. buy volume/SHROUT minus Inst. sell volume/SHROUT  
Net HF volume/SHROUT Net hedge fund activist’s trading volume (buy minus sell) as a percentage of shares 
outstanding.  Source: Schedule 13D. 
Return Stock return, including all distributions.  Source: CRSP. 
VIX CBOE volatility index, constructed using the implied volatilities of near- and next-
term put and call options with 23-37 days to expiration and various strike prices.  
Source: CBOE. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Ownership of Activist Hedge Funds and Other Institutions 
The figure plots the target firms’ mean cumulative ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding) of 
activist hedge funds and other institutions in the one-year period (starting from 0% on day t-360) before the 
public announcement of activism.  The sample period is 2000-2007.  Event date (day 0) refers to the date 
on which the hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 5% reporting threshold. The mean is calculated across 
643 campaigns for which trading data are available. Hedge fund trading data are collected from SEC filings 
and non-hedge fund institutional trades are from Ancerno. 
 
Figure 2: Net Trading Volume of Activist Hedge Funds and Other Institutions  
The figure plots the target firms’ mean daily net trading volume (as a percentage of shares outstanding) of 
activist hedge funds and other institutions during the 60 days before the public announcement of activism.  
The sample period is 2000-2007.  Event date (day 0) refers to the date on which the hedge fund’s ownership 
crosses the 5% reporting threshold.  The mean is calculated across 643 campaigns for which trading data 
are available.  Hedge fund trading data are collected from SEC filings and non-hedge fund institutional 
trades are from Ancerno. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Target and Non-Target Firms 
This table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for the sample of CRSP-Compustat firms that are 
targeted/ not targeted by hedge fund activists in 2000-2007. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Institutional 
trading data are from Ancerno. Institutional ownership and holdings data are from Thomson Reuters-13F. Mutual 
fund holdings data are from Thomson Reuters-Mutual Funds.  *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance (of 
the difference in means or medians) at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Additional statistics including 
standard deviation and various percentiles are reported in the Internet Appendix. 
 
  Target Firms   Non-Target Firms   Difference 
  N Mean Median  N Mean Median   Mean Median 
           
log(MV) 755 5.203 5.057  33,164 5.611 5.556  -0.407*** -0.499*** 
Tobin's Q 755 1.914 1.324  33,164 2.793 1.530  -0.879*** -0.206*** 
Leverage 755 0.276 0.231  33,164 0.300 0.258  -0.024** -0.027 
Dividend yield 755 0.008 0.000  33,164 0.010 0.000  -0.002 0.000 
Sales growth 755 0.168 0.062  33,164 0.262 0.098  -0.093*** -0.036*** 
ROA 755 0.049 0.095  33,164 0.044 0.095  0.005 0.000 
R&D/Assets 755 0.056 0.000  33,164 0.082 0.000  -0.025* 0.000 
Inst. ownership 755 0.513 0.507  33,164 0.438 0.424  0.075*** 0.083*** 
log(Analysts) 755 1.355 1.386  33,164 1.300 1.386  0.056 0.000 
-log(Amihud) 755 -1.259 -1.074  33,164 -1.245 -0.973  -0.014 -0.101 
Herfindahl index 755 0.037 0.028  33,164 0.036 0.027  0.000 0.001*** 
Return 755 0.057 -0.028  33,162 0.214 0.044  -0.157*** -0.072*** 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT 731 0.024 0.015  30,643 0.028 0.017  -0.004*** -0.002** 
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT 731 0.030 0.019  30,643 0.027 0.017  0.003*** 0.002** 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT 731 -0.006 -0.002  30,643 0.001 0.000  -0.007*** -0.002*** 
No. HFs with toehold 461 3.291 3.000  16,032 2.694 2.000  0.596*** 1.000*** 
HF toehold/SHROUT 461 0.053 0.034  16,032 0.021 0.006  0.032*** 0.029*** 
ΔMF holdings/SHROUT 636 -0.002 0.000  25,346 0.001 0.000  -0.003*** -0.001*** 
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Table 2: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Targeting 
This table reports OLS and limited information maximum likelihood (IV-LIML) estimates for linear 
probability models of hedge fund activist targeting.  Observations are firm-years and the sample period is 
2000-2007.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Columns (1)-(4) report OLS estimates.  The dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if a firm is targeted in an activist campaign.  Column (1) provides a 
benchmark model without non-activist institutional trading variables.  In columns (2)-(4), institutional trading 
is captured by Inst. net volume/SHROUT, Inst. sell and buy volumes/SHROUT, and ΔMF holdings/SHROUT, 
all of which are winsorized at 1%.  Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses.  Columns (5) 
and (6) report the first and second-stage IV-LIML estimates, respectively, for the model in column (4) whereby 
the endogenous regressor, ΔMF holdings/SHROUT, is expressed as a function of the excluded instruments, 
Exp. (MF fire sales/purchases)/SHROUT.  Robust standard errors, clustered by firm and corrected by Monte 
Carlo simulation for errors in estimating the expected trading volumes, are in parentheses.  All columns include 
year and industry fixed-effects.  All control variables are as of the end of the prior year.  *, **, and *** refer 
to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  OLS   IV-LIML 
 Target Dummy  
ΔMF 
holdings/ 
SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Target 
Dummy 
(2nd stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
        
Inst. net volume/ SHROUT  -0.168***      
  (0.045)      
Inst. sell volume/ SHROUT   0.135***     
   (0.045)     
Inst. buy volume/ SHROUT   -0.185***     
   (0.055)     
ΔMF holdings/ SHROUT    -0.868***   -2.425** 
    (0.126)   (1.152) 
Exp. (MF fire sales)/SHROUT      -0.133***  
      (0.048)  
Exp. (MF fire purchases)/SHROUT     0.195***  
      (0.017)  
-log(Amihud) 0.006*** 0.004* 0.004** 0.005*  0.001*** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.003) 
log(MV) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***  0.000*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Tobin's Q -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst. ownership 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.034***  -0.004*** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.007) 
Sales growth -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.003***  0.000 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
ROA -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008**  0.001*** -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.004) 
Cont’d on next page.  
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Cont’d from previous page. 
  OLS   IV-LIML 
 Target Dummy  
ΔMF 
holdings/ 
SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Target 
Dummy 
(2nd stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
        
Dividend yield -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.010) 
R&D/Assets -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.002  0.001** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index 0.131 0.090 0.091 0.062  0.041*** 0.126 
 (0.233) (0.245) (0.245) (0.271)  (0.015) (0.276) 
log(Analysts) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  -0.000*** -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.002) 
Return -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000  0.001*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
        
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald 
statistic 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
F(2, 6159) = 65.057                         
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 8.68) 
Hansen J statistic N/A N/A N/A N/A χ2(1) = 1.628 
        
Observations 33,919 31,374 31,374 25,982  25,982 25,982 
R-squared (within) 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.017   0.026 0.010 
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Table 3: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting 
This table reports pseudo maximum likelihood estimates of discrete-time proportional hazard (complementary 
log-log) models for activist targeting (Panel A) and for first acquisition of a toehold by a known activism-
focused hedge fund (Panel B).  Activism-focused hedge funds are defined as hedge funds that launch more 
than the median number of campaigns during the sample period.  Observations are firm-quarters.  All variables 
are defined in Appendix A.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is a “target” dummy, which equals one in the 
quarter in which a firm is targeted, and 0 in all prior quarters.  For each firm, the spell starts when at least one 
activism-focused hedge fund acquires a toehold in the firm, and ends when the firm is targeted in an activist 
campaign (i.e., the spell is complete) or when the sample ends (i.e., the spell is right-censored), whichever 
comes first.  Firms with existing activism-focused hedge fund toeholds at the beginning of the sample period 
in 2000 suffer from left censorship, which is corrected by two approaches to ensure robustness.  
CORRECTION 1 recovers the first acquisition of a toehold through 13F reports dating back to the first quarter 
of 1994.  CORRECTION 2 drops all left-censored spells.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is a “recognition” 
dummy, which equals one in the quarter in which at least one activism-focused hedge fund acquires a toehold 
in a firm for the first time, and 0 in all prior quarters.  For each firm, the spell starts when the firm becomes 
exposed to the risk of a toehold acquisition (defined as the time when the firm’s shares become publicly 
tradable and can be purchased by a hedge fund), and ends when at least one activist has a toehold in the firm 
(i.e., the spell is complete) or when the sample ends (i.e., the spell is right-censored), whichever comes first.  
Firms that already exist but are without any activism-focused hedge fund toeholds at the beginning of the 
sample period in 2000 suffer from left censorship, which is corrected by two alternative approaches.  
CORRECTION 1 sets the start of a left-censored spell to the first quarter in which the firm appears in CRSP 
or the first quarter of 1994, whichever comes later.  CORRECTION 2 drops all left-censored spells.  Inst. net 
(sell/buy) volume/SHROUT is winsorized at 1%.  All models specify baseline hazards as piecewise-constant, 
by including survival duration fixed effects.  Survival duration is discrete and measured as the number of 
quarters from the beginning of the spell.  In addition, all models include vintage, calendar year-quarter, and 
industry fixed effects.  All control variables are as of the end of the prior quarter.  Robust standard errors, 
clustered by survival duration, are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  For brevity, IV counterparts of the results are reported in the Internet Appendix. 
 
(See next page) 
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Table 3, cont’d: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting 
Panel A: Failure = First Activist Targeting Firm 
  
CORRECTION 1 
for Left Censorship   
CORRECTION 2 
for Left Censorship 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT -4.176***   -4.012***  
 (0.512)   (0.498)  
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT  4.595***   4.421*** 
  (0.582)   (0.586) 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT  -5.559***   -5.778** 
  (1.893)   (2.840) 
-log(Amihud) -0.054 -0.045  -0.206 -0.193 
 (0.139) (0.142)  (0.203) (0.210) 
log(MV) -0.420*** -0.421***  -0.396*** -0.397*** 
 (0.082) (0.082)  (0.086) (0.086) 
Tobin's Q -0.044 -0.041  -0.057 -0.054 
 (0.033) (0.032)  (0.045) (0.043) 
Inst. ownership 1.403*** 1.421***  1.416*** 1.447*** 
 (0.254) (0.253)  (0.296) (0.277) 
Sales growth -0.141 -0.136  -0.106 -0.100 
 (0.086) (0.085)  (0.086) (0.082) 
ROA -0.427 -0.406  -0.492** -0.466** 
 (0.262) (0.271)  (0.194) (0.193) 
Leverage -0.238 -0.238  -0.270 -0.270 
 (0.233) (0.233)  (0.255) (0.254) 
Dividend yield 0.401 0.394  0.438*** 0.430** 
 (0.298) (0.302)  (0.163) (0.170) 
R&D/Assets -0.754 -0.744  -0.872 -0.864 
 (0.507) (0.509)  (0.582) (0.588) 
Herfindahl index -4.053 -4.089  -12.434 -12.461 
 (11.343) (11.347)  (14.573) (14.543) 
log(Analysts) 0.010 0.015  0.057 0.064 
 (0.071) (0.073)  (0.089) (0.093) 
Return -0.226 -0.216  -0.232 -0.220 
 (0.179) (0.175)  (0.149) (0.155) 
      
Survival duration (in quarters) fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Vintage fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Year-quarter fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 65,370 65,370  47,878 47,878 
Pseudo-likelihood ratio statistic 438 440   324 326 
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Table 3, cont’d: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting 
Panel B: Failure = First Activism-Focused Hedge Fund Acquiring Toehold in Firm 
  
CORRECTION 1 
for Left Censorship   
CORRECTION 2 
for Left Censorship 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT 0.607*   1.106  
 (0.331)   (0.848)  
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT  0.162   0.048 
  (0.338)   (0.795) 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT  1.297***   1.556 
  (0.320)   (0.956) 
-log(Amihud) 0.454*** 0.439***  0.859*** 0.832*** 
 (0.072) (0.073)  (0.185) (0.181) 
log(MV) 0.150*** 0.152***  -0.092* -0.085 
 (0.039) (0.040)  (0.056) (0.054) 
Tobin's Q -0.004 -0.004  -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Inst. ownership 0.562*** 0.491***  0.417 0.342 
 (0.093) (0.101)  (0.304) (0.350) 
Sales growth -0.001 -0.005  0.021 0.022 
 (0.021) (0.021)  (0.043) (0.044) 
ROA 0.307*** 0.299***  0.198* 0.185* 
 (0.065) (0.063)  (0.112) (0.108) 
Leverage -0.041 -0.032  -0.098 -0.082 
 (0.068) (0.069)  (0.144) (0.136) 
Dividend yield 0.010 0.029  -0.208 -0.225 
 (0.452) (0.429)  (0.749) (0.753) 
R&D/Assets -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index 7.279 7.197  6.826 6.501 
 (4.683) (4.694)  (12.701) (12.609) 
log(Analysts) -0.107*** -0.115***  0.184*** 0.176*** 
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.061) (0.061) 
Return 0.051*** 0.048***  0.103 0.092 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.078) (0.077) 
      
Survival duration (in quarters) fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Vintage fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Year-quarter fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 53,448 53,448  6,009 6,009 
Pseudo-likelihood ratio statistic 5,838 5,854   989 991 
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Table 4: Activist and Non-Activist Institutional Trading in Target Firms 
This table presents cross-sectional mean statistics of activist hedge fund and non-activist institutional trading 
in firms targeted by hedge fund activists in 2000-2007.  Only campaigns with available trading data are 
included.  Panel A reports hedge fund trades for the entire 60-day period for which the hedge funds report their 
trades in SEC Schedule 13D. Panel B reports institutional trades both for the 60-day period in which the hedge 
funds report their trades and for the prior 180 days.  For each campaign, day t-60 (t-240) refers to day -60 (-
240) from the file date, and event date refers to the date on which the hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 5% 
reporting threshold.  Institutional trading data are from Ancerno, and an institution is a unique combination of 
client code and client manager code. 
 
Panel A: Hedge Fund Trading 
  
Trade as 
% of 
Market 
Volume 
Shares Purchased as % of Average 
Price as 
% of 
Price on 
File Date 
Number of Trades % of 
Shares 
Purchased 
in Open 
Market Period N 
Shares 
Outstanding 
Total 
Shares on 
File Date Total 
Open 
Market 
[t-60, Event Date) 589 12.53% 2.65% 41.08% 94.12% 185 185 98.79% 
Event Date 581 41.24% 1.02% 13.68% 97.58% 14 14 97.28% 
(Event Date, File Date] 452 17.63% 1.28% 16.93% 98.61% 72 71 98.70% 
         
[t-60, File Date] 643 15.78% 4.25% 61.89% 98.17% 232 232 97.51% 
 
 
Panel B: Institutional Trading 
  
Trade as 
% of 
Market 
Volume 
Volume/ Shares Outstanding 
 
Number of 
Institutions  
Number of 
Trades per 
Institution 
Period N Buy Sell Net 
  
Net 
Buy 
Net 
Sell   Buy Sell 
[t-240, t-60) 682 13.46% 6.41% -7.43% -1.02% 
 
56 70  13 11 
            
[t-60, Event Date) 625 15.14% 1.93% -2.93% -1.00% 
 
25 33  9 10 
Event Date 447 20.35% 0.12% -0.46% -0.34% 
 
3 5  3 3 
(Event Date, File Date] 518 14.53% 0.92% -1.28% -0.36% 
 
14 15  5 5             
[t-60, File Date] 643 14.36% 2.71% -4.21% -1.50% 
  
30 40   10 10 
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Table 5: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Purchases of Target Shares (OLS) 
This table reports OLS estimates for regressions of activist purchases of target shares on institutional trades.  
The sample consists of firms targeted by hedge fund activists in 2000-2007, for which both hedge fund 
transaction data from SEC Schedule 13D and institutional transaction data from Ancerno are available.  
Observations are campaign-days.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  The dependent variable is net 
hedge fund volume as a percentage of shares outstanding.  Columns (1)-(4) include campaign fixed effects 
whereas columns (5)-(6) include cumulative abnormal return (CAR), cumulative abnormal turnover (CAT), 
and cumulative abnormal Amihud ratio (CAA) in the period from t-240 to t-60 as campaign-level controls.  
Net hedge fund volume/SHROUT and Inst. net (sell/buy) volume/SHROUT are winsorized at 1%.  All 
explanatory variables are contemporaneous, unless noted as lagged.  Robust standard errors, clustered by 
campaign, are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT -0.166***  -0.167***  -0.154***  
 (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.024)  
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT  0.263***  0.268***  0.229*** 
  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.029) 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT  0.012  0.014  -0.005 
  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l1   0.127*** 0.125*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l2   0.045*** 0.044*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l3   0.004 0.002 0.023** 0.021* 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l4   0.023** 0.023** 0.044*** 0.042*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l5   0.006 0.006 0.029** 0.027** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CRSP value-weighted return -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* -0.004* -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
VIX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted turnover 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
        
Market condition controls NONE Lags 1 to 5 of 
abnormal return and 
abnormal Amihud 
Lags 1 to 5 of 
abnormal return and 
abnormal Amihud 
   
Campaign-level controls Campaign dummies Campaign dummies CAR (t-240 to t-60), 
CAT (t-240 to t-60), 
CAA (t-240 to t-60)   
    
N 22,809 22,809 18,117 18,117 18,091 18,091 
R-squared (within) 0.039 0.048 0.063 0.072 0.082 0.088 
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Table 6: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Purchases of Target Shares (IV Analysis) 
This table reports limited information maximum likelihood (IV-LIML) estimates of the effects of 
institutional trades on activist purchases of target shares. The OLS counterparts are in Table 5.  Observations 
are campaign-days.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  The dependent variable is net hedge fund 
volume as a percentage of shares outstanding, and the endogenous regressors are institutional net volume 
(column (2)) and institutional buy and sell volumes (column (5)).  Columns (1) and (3)-(4) report estimates 
of the first-stage equations, in which the endogenous regressors are expressed as a function of the excluded 
instruments – expected institutional buy and sell volumes calculated as the sums of individual institutions’ 
expected buy and sell volumes in target stocks, conditional on their trading activities in non-target stocks 
outside the target’s SIC-2 industry (models in columns (3) and (4) of Table IA.VI in the Internet Appendix).  
All columns include campaign fixed-effects.  Net hedge fund volume/SHROUT and Inst. net (sell/buy) 
volume/SHROUT are winsorized at 1%.  All explanatory variables are contemporaneous, unless noted as 
lagged.  Robust standard errors, clustered by campaign and corrected by Monte Carlo simulation for errors 
in estimating the expected institutional buy and sell volumes, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Net HF 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(2nd stage)   
Inst. sell 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Inst. buy 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Net HF 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(2nd stage) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT  -0.147**     
  (0.070)     
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT      0.205** 
      (0.093) 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT      -0.051 
      (0.131) 
Exp. (inst. sell volume)/SHROUT -0.563***   0.632*** 0.063**  
 (0.060)   (0.056) (0.026)  
Exp. (inst. buy volume)/SHROUT 0.326***   0.157*** 0.489***  
 (0.068)   (0.039) (0.059)  
Net HF volume/SHROUT l1 -0.015** 0.128***  0.013** -0.002 0.127*** 
 (0.006) (0.020)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.020) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l2 -0.003 0.046***  0.005 0.001 0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.011)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l3 -0.001 0.000  0.005 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l4 -0.007 0.024**  0.005 -0.000 0.024** 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) 
Net HF volume/SHROUT l5 0.007 0.007  -0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.011)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) 
       
Market condition controls CRSP value-weighted return, VIX, adjusted turnover, and lags 1 to 5 
of abnormal return and abnormal Amihud 
Campaign-level controls Campaign dummies 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic                                               F(2, 618) = 67.247                 
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 8.68) 
 
F(1, 618) = 51.778                                                      
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 7.03) 
Hansen J statistic χ2(1) = 0.824  N/A 
N 18,117 18,117  18,117 18,117 18,117 
R-squared (within) 0.044 0.038   0.087 0.063 0.046 
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Table 7: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Purchases by Level of Activism Benefits 
This table reports OLS estimates for regressions of activist purchases of target shares on institutional trades 
for targets with varying levels of activism benefits.  Observations are campaign-days. The dependent variable 
is net hedge fund volume as a percentage of shares outstanding.  Panel A measures potential benefits from 
activism by a firm’s propensity to be targeted estimated in column (1) of Table 2 (without institutional trading 
variables).  Columns (1) and (2) split the targets into those with below/above median target propensities, 
respectively.  Columns (3)-(4) interact institutional trading with a dummy for above median target propensity 
(High benefits dummy) and with a firm’s target propensity (Benefits), respectively.  Panel B measures activism 
benefits by the total toehold of known activist hedge funds in a target at the end of the most recent quarter 
before the campaign start.  Columns (1)-(3) split the targets into those with no toehold and those with 
below/above median (non-zero) total toehold, respectively.  Columns (4)-(5) interact institutional trading with 
a dummy for above median total toehold (High benefits dummy) and with total toehold (Benefits), respectively. 
Net hedge fund volume/SHROUT and Inst. net volume/SHROUT are winsorized at 1%.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  All models include campaign fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors, clustered by 
campaign, are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  For brevity, IV counterparts of the results are reported in the Internet Appendix. 
Panel A: Benefits Defined as Target Propensity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Propensity < 
Median 
Propensity ≥ 
Median All All 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT -0.199*** -0.102*** -0.201*** -0.155*** 
 (0.036) (0.024) (0.035) (0.022) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT    0.090**  
     x High benefits dummy   (0.042)  
Inst. net volume/SHROUT x Benefits    11.959*** 
    (4.161) 
     
Market condition controls Lags 1 to 5 of net HF volume/SHROUT, CRSP value-
weighted return, VIX, adjusted turnover, and lags 1 to 5 
of abnormal return and abnormal Amihud 
Campaign-level controls Campaign dummies 
N 7,930 8,344 16,274 16,274 
R-squared (within) 0.079 0.070 0.071 0.072 
 
Panel B: Benefits Defined as Total Hedge Fund Toehold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
TOE(HF)  
= 0 
TOE(HF)  
< Median 
TOE(HF)  
≥ Median All All 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT -0.258*** -0.182*** -0.120*** -0.223*** -0.226*** 
 (0.092) (0.039) (0.036) (0.043) (0.039) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT    0.110**  
     x High benefits dummy    (0.048)  
Inst. net volume/SHROUT x Benefits     1.481** 
     (0.646) 
      
Market condition controls Lags 1 to 5 of net HF volume/SHROUT, CRSP value-weighted 
return, VIX, adjusted turnover, and lags 1 to 5 of abnormal return 
and abnormal Amihud 
Campaign-level controls Campaign dummies 
N 5,116 6,484 6,517 18,117 18,117 
R-squared (within) 0.063 0.128 0.068 0.063 0.064 
 
Internet Appendix for 
Institutional Trading and Hedge Fund Activism  
This Internet Appendix provides supplemental information and analyses to the main tables and 
figures.  The first section describes: 
(1) The construction of firm-day expected institutional trading volumes used as excluded instruments 
in the hedge fund purchasing regressions in Tables 6 and IA.VII. 
(2) The construction of firm-year and firm-quarter expected institutional trading volumes used 
as excluded instruments in the hedge fund targeting regressions in Table IA.II and the 
proportional hazard analyses of activist toehold acquisition and targeting in Table IA.III. 
(3) The nature of institutional and hedge fund trading preceding activism events. 
The second section presents supplemental figures and tables: 
Figure IA.1: Ownership of Hedge Funds and Other Institutions around the Announcement of 
Activism (Quarterly 13F Reports) 
Figure IA.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Hedge Fund Trade Prices 
Figure IA.3: Net Trading Volume of Hedge Funds and Other Institutions by Quartiles of Total 
Hedge Fund Purchases 
Figure IA.4: Individual Institution’s Trading in Generic Stock as Function of Its Trading in 
Other Stocks  
Table IA.I: Characteristics of Target and Non-Target Firms (Full Version of Table 1) 
Table IA.II: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Targeting – IV Analysis (IV Estimates of 
Models (2) and (3) in Table 2) 
Table IA.III: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting – IV 
Analysis (IV Estimates of Models in Table 3) 
Table IA.IV: Trading in Target Stocks by Top Institutional Sellers and Buyers 
Table IA.V: Trading in Non-Target Stocks by Top Institutional Sellers and Buyers 
Table IA.VI: Probability That Individual Institution Will Buy or Sell Generic Stock as Function 
of Its Trading in Other Stocks 
Table IA.VII: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Purchases by Level of Activism Benefits 
– IV Analysis (IV Estimates of Models in Table 7) 
Table IA.VIII: Analysis of Institutional Transaction Times in Trading Target and Other Stocks  
Table IA.IX: Analysis of Institutional and Hedge Fund Transaction Costs in Trading Target and 
Other Stocks   
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Construction of Firm-Day Expected Institutional Trading Volumes 
We use firm-day expected institutional trades to identify the liquidity effects of institutional selling and 
buying volumes on hedge fund purchases.  While the analysis only applies to target firms, we estimate the 
institutions’ trading behavior from all CRSP-Compustat firms that the institutions trade.  This is to avoid 
any potential bias or violation of the exclusion restriction that may result from the ex-post assignment of 
firms into targets and non-targets.  For example, in response to negative funding changes, institutions may 
sell disproportionately more shares in a target than in other stocks because the activist’s purchases drive up 
prices and improve the liquidity of target shares, making selling the target stock relatively more attractive 
than selling other stocks.  
We begin with the universe of all institution-firm-days during our sample period from 2000 to 2007.  This 
universe contains tens of billions of observations, rendering any statistical estimation practically infeasible.  
To economize on computational resources, we limit the sample to include (i) all institutions that trade target 
stocks at least twice during the 60-day period before a campaign file date (to represent the institutions that 
hold these firms’ stocks during the period of activist block formation) and (ii) all firms that are traded at 
least once by these institutions during that period (to represent all firms held by the relevant institutions).   
Our calculation of firm-day expected institutional buy and sell volumes is as follows.  First, we estimate 
the parameters of linear models that relate the probabilities that each individual institution will buy or sell 
a generic firm’s stock to its trading in other stocks outside the generic firm’s SIC-2 industry.  Figure IA.4 
presents the univariate relationships.  Table IA.VI presents the multivariate model specifications and the 
average parameter estimates.  In Columns (1) and (2), we proxy for the institution’s trading in other stocks 
using the fraction of sell principal [= dollar volume of other stocks sold/(dollar volume of other stocks sold 
+ dollar volume of other stocks purchased)].  In Columns (3) and (4), we use the fraction of stocks sold [= 
number of other stocks sold/(number of other stocks sold + number of other stocks purchased)].  Since our 
sample contains over three million institution-firm-day observations, for computational efficiency, we 
perform the estimation separately for each calendar quarter.  The results are similar across the two proxies; 
therefore, below we only plot the estimated coefficients of the variable Dummy (trade other stocks) x 
Fraction of other stocks sold from the models in Columns (3) and (4).  The estimates are significant and 
positive for selling probability and significant and negative for buying probability in all quarters, and seem 
to become larger in magnitude towards the end of the sample period.   
Second, we proceed to calculate the expected selling (or similarly buying) volume of institution i in target 
stock j on day t as 
Ei�sell volumej,t� = Pri�sellj,t�×Ei�sell volumej|sellj� 
where the sell probability, Pri�sellj,t�, is calculated using the parameter estimates obtained in the first step 
from the sample of all institutions and firms, and the conditional expected trade size of institution i in stock 
j, Ei�sell volumej|sellj�, is the average volume of institution i in stock j conditional on buying or selling it 
during the period t-240 to t-60 (or, the period before hedge funds actively accumulate target shares to launch 
a campaign).   
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Finally, we aggregate the expected sell (or similarly buy) volumes across all institutions 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑁𝑁,  
𝐸𝐸�sell volumej,t� =� Ei�sell volumej,t�,
 N
i=1
 
to obtain the expected total selling volume in stock j on day t, 𝐸𝐸�sell volumej,t�.  We calculate the expected 
total buying volume in a stock in the same manner. 
 
Coefficients of Dummy[trade other stocks] x Fraction of other stocks sold in Buying 
Probability Model 
 
Coefficients of Dummy[trade other stocks] x Fraction of other stocks sold in Selling 
Probability Model 
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Construction of Firm-Year and Firm-Quarter Expected Institutional Trading Volumes 
We use firm-year expected institutional trades to identify the liquidity effects of institutional selling and 
buying volumes on the probability of becoming an activist target.  These expected trades provide a 
robustness check in Table IA.II to the IV results based on mutual fund flows in Table 2 of the paper.  The 
sample includes all CRSP-Compustat firm-years, about 2.5% of which experience activism events while 
the rest do not.  Therefore, unlike the analysis of hedge fund purchases of target shares, which naturally 
only applies to target firms, here we need expected trades for all firm-years, i.e., for targets and non-targets.  
Since the expected trades are constructed at the institution level, the observational unit in our estimation is 
institution-firm-time period (day or week).  If we follow the same construction as in the analysis of hedge 
fund purchases, then we will need to estimate model parameters using several billion institution-firm-day 
observations over the eight-year sample period.  To economize on computational resources, we resort to 
the weekly frequency, and again perform the estimation separately for each calendar quarter.  Otherwise, 
the construction of firm-year expected institutional trades follows the same process as that of firm-day 
expected institutional trades. 
We begin by estimating the propensity that each institution will sell or buy a generic firm’s stock in each 
week as a function of its trading in other stocks outside the generic firm’s SIC-2 industry.  We use the same 
specifications as in Table IA.VI.  We plot below the quarterly estimated coefficients of the variable Dummy 
[trade other stocks] x Fraction of other stocks sold from the models in Columns (3) and (4).  Consistent 
with the estimates at the daily frequency, the estimates here are all significant and positive for selling 
probability, and significant and negative for buying probability. 
 
Coefficients of Dummy[trade other stocks] x Fraction of other stocks sold in Buying 
Probability Model 
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Coefficients of Dummy[trade other stocks] x Fraction of other stocks sold in Selling 
Probability Model 
 
We then use the average quarterly estimates to calculate the predicted propensities that each institution will 
sell and buy each firm’s stock in each week, and multiply these predicted propensities by the institution’s 
average trade size per week to obtain the institution’s expected buy and sell volumes for that firm-week.  
We then sum these institution-level expected buy and sell volumes across all institutions in each week to 
obtain the expected buy and sell volumes for each firm-week.  Finally, we take the 90th percentile of the 
expected weekly volumes within a quarter and the maximum of these 90th percentiles across all quarters 
within a year to get to the expected buy and sell volumes for each firm-year.  Note that the magnitudes of 
these expected volumes are still based on the weekly trades.  The reason for taking the high end of the 
distribution is that hedge funds often accumulate the majority of their activist stakes in just a few weeks, 
and therefore what is relevant for our analysis should be not the average or median institutional trading over 
the entire year but rather the most intense trading that may concentrate in just a few weeks. 
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Nature of Institutional and Hedge Fund Trading Preceding Activism Events 
We offer additional evidence and discussion to broadly characterize the institutions’ trading behavior in 
target and non-target stocks and support the argument that our instruments are plausibly exogenous to a 
model of hedge fund purchases. We start with Table IA.VIII, which shows that Ancerno institutions trade 
target stocks around the activism events in virtually the same manner as they do other stocks.  Thus, the 
institutions’ trading process does not appear to vary with intraday market conditions that may be induced 
by the hedge funds’ purchases of target shares. 
Next, we investigate transaction costs to study the dynamics of liquidity demand and supply by institutions 
and hedge funds.1  The microstructure literature often relies on order type classification to differentiate 
liquidity demand from supply; limit orders are generally associated with supplying liquidity whereas market 
orders are perceived as demanding liquidity.  However, Ancerno does not provide such classification. 
Therefore, we adopt the approach in Puckett and Yan (2011) and Franzoni and Plazzi (2013) who estimate 
an institution’s liquidity provision by the price impact of its trades.  This approach is also used by Ancerno 
and by practitioners to evaluate execution quality.  Specifically, we estimate a buy (sell) order’s price impact 
as its execution price minus the stock’s daily volume-weighted average price, VWAP (the stock’s daily 
VWAP minus the order’s execution price), expressed as a percentage of VWAP.  Trades that demand 
liquidity are expected to have positive price impact or transaction costs.  
Table IA.IX reports summary statistics of transaction costs for target and non-target stocks around the 
public announcement of activism.  Columns (1)-(5) focus on the Ancerno institutions and the last column 
on the activist hedge funds.  Columns (2) and (3) show that institutions generally demand liquidity when 
selling both target and non-target stocks (i.e., their transaction costs are positive and statistically 
significant), consistent with the findings of Campbell et al. (2009).  The average price impact of institutional 
sales is highest on the activism event date for both target and non-target stocks (two to three times higher), 
suggesting that these institutions are impatient on that day, possibly experiencing negative funding shocks.2  
In Column (5), we formally test the difference in the transaction costs of selling target and non-target stocks, 
and find that by and large, the differences are not statistically significant. Thus, from transaction cost 
perspective, institutions trade target and non-target stocks in the same manner. 
To ease the comparison with institutional trades, we benchmark hedge fund transaction costs against the 
same VWAP.  The last column shows that hedge funds seem to trade patiently, providing liquidity during 
the 60 days before the start of a campaign and on the event date (even though the latter lacks statistical 
significance).  This appearance of liquidity provision may be a result of the hedge funds attempting to 
camouflage their intentions, as predicted by the liquidity theories, by buying when institutions sell and 
prices hobble near daily lows.  It is also interesting to note that the average activist seems to demand 
liquidity in the days between the event and file dates when he acquires an additional 1.28% of the target’s 
                                                          
1 The Ancerno dataset puts certain limitations on our ability to provide a detailed microstructure analysis.  For example, 
Ancerno often batches together trades that are in the same direction and executed by the same broker on the same day; 
hence, individual trades and order types (e.g., limit vs. market) cannot be inferred. 
2 In contrast, institutional buy transactions are usually associated with lower transaction costs (Column (1)), which 
turn negative on the activism event date.  This implies that these institutions are patient in their buy decisions. 
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outstanding shares.  Even though the estimate of transaction costs here is not statistically significant, its 
large positive magnitude suggests that the average activist turns impatient after crossing the 5% threshold, 
consistent with the idea that once he has obtained a large enough stake to cover his monitoring costs, he 
has no need to camouflage his intent and rushes to buy target shares to maximize his expected return.  
Why do few institutions sell such a large quantity of target shares on the event date?  In a frictionless world, 
only investors with short-lived information would rush to trade a large quantity of stocks and incur large 
price impact.  In reality, institutions face a number of constraints ranging from funding requirements (Coval 
and Stafford, 2007) to capital regulations (Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011).  Such institutional 
constraints may force institutions to immediately buy or sell assets and concede on price to compensate 
counterparties for liquidity provision.  We argue that negative funding shocks may explain the behavior of 
top selling institutions on the event date.  Notably, these institutions’ sales of the targets are relatively small 
in dollar terms compared to their usual trading volumes and the sales of other stocks.  For example, an 
average top seller sells a total of $1,079.82 million worth of stocks on the event date, and the target stocks 
account for only $1.89 million (< 0.20%). 
To summarize, the evidence in Tables IA.VIII and IA.IX suggests that for the most part, institutional trading 
in target firms is not driven by target-specific information or by hedge fund trading, and hence is likely 
exogenous to the activism events.   
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Figure IA.1: Ownership of Hedge Funds and Other Institutions around the Announcement of 
Activism (Quarterly 13F Reports) 
The figure plots changes in the target firms’ mean and median ownership of hedge funds and other 
institutions over the four quarters surrounding the start of an activist campaign. The sample includes 937 
campaigns in 2000-2007, for which hedge fund and institutional quarterly ownership data are available 
from Thomson Reuters-13F.  The reference quarter (Quarter 0) contains the date of the public 
announcement (in Schedule 13D filing).  
 
 
Figure IA.2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Hedge Fund Trade Prices 
The figure plots the target firms’ mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and mean ratio of the hedge 
fund’s (trade size-weighted) trade price to the closing price on the Schedule 13D file date.  The sample 
period is 2000-2007.  CARs are calculated by the market-model adjustment approach, in which the CRSP 
value-weighted index is used as the market portfolio and the loading of each target stock return on the 
market return is estimated using the period from 600 to 240 days before 13D filing.  The mean is calculated 
across 643 campaigns for which hedge fund trading data are available from 13D reports. 
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Figure IA.3: Net Trading Volume of Hedge Funds and Other Institutions by Quartiles of Total 
Hedge Fund Purchases  
The figure plots the target firms’ mean daily net trading volume (as a percentage of shares outstanding) of 
activist hedge funds and other institutions during the 60 days before the public announcement of activism 
in Schedule 13D.  The sample period is 2000-2007.  The mean is calculated across 643 campaigns sorted 
into quartiles by the total fraction of shares outstanding purchased by the activist hedge fund (Q1 includes 
the campaigns with the largest hedge fund purchases).  Event date (day 0) refers to the date on which the 
hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 5% reporting threshold.  Hedge fund trading data are collected from 
13D reports and non-hedge fund institutional trades are from Ancerno. 
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Figure IA.4: Individual Institution’s Trading in Generic Stock as Function of Its Trading in Other 
Stocks 
These figures plot the percentages of institution-firm-days (Panel A) and institution-firm-weeks (Panel B) 
in which a generic firm’s stock is sold or bought conditional on the institutions’ contemporaneous trading 
patterns in other stocks outside of the generic firm’s SIC-2 industry.  Observations are sorted into deciles 
by the fraction of other stocks sold measured in terms of $ principal or number of individual stocks.  
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Table IA.I: Characteristics of Target and Non-Target Firms (Full Version of Table 1) 
This table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for the full sample of CRSP-Compustat firms and 
the subsamples of firms targeted and not targeted by hedge fund activists in 2000-2007.  All variables are defined 
in Appendix A of the paper.  Institutional trading data are from Ancerno.  Institutional ownership and toehold 
data are from Thomson Reuters-13F. Mutual fund holdings data are from Thomson Reuters-Mutual Funds.   
 
Panel A: Target Firms 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
         
log(MV) 755 5.203 1.805 2.397 3.892 5.057 6.440 8.383 
Tobin's Q 755 1.914 1.882 0.584 0.971 1.324 2.211 4.736 
Leverage 755 0.276 0.269 0.000 0.006 0.231 0.469 0.787 
Dividend yield 755 0.008 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 
Sales growth 755 0.168 0.682 -0.399 -0.033 0.062 0.198 0.787 
ROA 755 0.049 0.261 -0.314 0.015 0.095 0.167 0.302 
R&D/Assets 755 0.056 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.245 
Inst. ownership 755 0.513 0.289 0.057 0.260 0.507 0.772 0.940 
log(Analysts) 755 1.355 1.063 0.000 0.000 1.386 2.197 3.091 
-log(Amihud) 755 -1.259 0.924 -3.092 -1.853 -1.074 -0.468 -0.160 
Herfindahl index 755 0.037 0.035 0.015 0.024 0.028 0.033 0.133 
Return 755 0.057 0.836 -0.693 -0.356 -0.028 0.240 1.016 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT 731 0.024 0.028 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.036 0.081 
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT 731 0.030 0.032 0.000 0.005 0.019 0.045 0.094 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT 731 -0.006 0.021 -0.041 -0.013 -0.002 0.003 0.022 
No. HFs with toehold 461 3.291 2.360 1.000 1.000 3.000 5.000 8.000 
HF toehold/SHROUT 461 0.053 0.057 0.001 0.009 0.034 0.076 0.169 
ΔMF holdings/SHROUT 636 -0.002 0.011 -0.026 -0.007 0.000 0.002 0.014 
 
Panel B: Non-Target Firms 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
         
log(MV) 33,164 5.611 2.151 2.191 4.094 5.556 7.014 9.340 
Tobin's Q 33,164 2.793 8.744 0.625 1.053 1.530 2.714 7.692 
Leverage 33,164 0.300 0.271 0.000 0.024 0.258 0.508 0.796 
Dividend yield 33,164 0.010 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.041 
Sales growth 33,164 0.262 0.822 -0.321 -0.017 0.098 0.270 1.155 
ROA 33,164 0.044 0.305 -0.426 0.017 0.095 0.173 0.338 
R&D/Assets 33,164 0.082 2.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.306 
Inst. ownership 33,164 0.438 0.296 0.014 0.163 0.424 0.696 0.911 
log(Analysts) 33,164 1.300 1.093 0.000 0.000 1.386 2.197 3.178 
-log(Amihud) 33,164 -1.245 0.980 -3.154 -1.889 -0.973 -0.431 -0.126 
Herfindahl index 33,164 0.036 0.037 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.032 0.148 
Return 33,162 0.214 1.100 -0.728 -0.261 0.044 0.379 1.618 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT 30,643 0.028 0.038 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.041 0.090 
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT 30,643 0.027 0.034 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.039 0.087 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT 30,643 0.001 0.029 -0.026 -0.005 0.000 0.007 0.029 
No. HFs with toehold 16,032 2.694 2.156 1.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 7.000 
HF toehold/SHROUT 16,032 0.021 0.036 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.021 0.102 
ΔMF holdings/SHROUT 25,346 0.001 0.009 -0.014 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.016 
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Table IA.I, cont’d: Characteristics of Target and Non-Target Firms (Full Version of Table 1) 
Panel C: All Firms 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
         
log(MV) 33,919 5.602 2.145 2.199 4.088 5.542 7.001 9.317 
Tobin's Q 33,919 2.774 8.652 0.623 1.051 1.524 2.700 7.607 
Leverage 33,919 0.299 0.271 0.000 0.023 0.257 0.507 0.796 
Dividend yield 33,919 0.010 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.041 
Sales growth 33,919 0.260 0.819 -0.322 -0.017 0.097 0.268 1.145 
ROA 33,919 0.044 0.304 -0.424 0.017 0.095 0.173 0.338 
R&D/Assets 33,919 0.081 2.171 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.305 
Inst. ownership 33,919 0.439 0.296 0.014 0.165 0.426 0.698 0.912 
log(Analysts) 33,919 1.301 1.092 0.000 0.000 1.386 2.197 3.178 
-log(Amihud) 33,919 -1.245 0.979 -3.152 -1.888 -0.976 -0.432 -0.127 
Herfindahl index 33,919 0.036 0.037 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.032 0.148 
Return 33,917 0.211 1.095 -0.727 -0.263 0.042 0.376 1.603 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT 31,374 0.028 0.038 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.041 0.090 
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT 31,374 0.027 0.034 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.040 0.087 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT 31,374 0.001 0.029 -0.026 -0.005 0.000 0.007 0.029 
No. HFs with toehold 16,493 2.711 2.164 1.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 7.000 
HF toehold/SHROUT 16,493 0.022 0.037 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.022 0.106 
ΔMF holding/SHROUT 25,982 0.001 0.009 -0.014 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.016 
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Table IA.II: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Targeting – IV Analysis (IV Estimates of 
Models (2) and (3) in Table 2) 
This table reports limited information maximum likelihood (IV-LIML) estimates of the effects of institutional 
trading on the probability that a firm will become an activist target.  The OLS counterparts and the alternative 
IV results, based on mutual fund flows, are in Table 2.  Observations are firm-years.  All variables are defined 
in Appendix A of the paper.  The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a firm is targeted in an activist 
campaign in a given year, and the endogenous regressors are institutional net volume (column (2)) and 
institutional buy and sell volumes (column (5)).  Columns (1) and (3)-(4) report estimates of the first-stage 
equations, in which the endogenous regressors are expressed as a function of the excluded instruments – 
expected institutional buy and sell volumes calculated as the sums of individual institutions’ expected buying 
and selling in a given stock, conditional on their trading in other stocks outside the given stock’s SIC-2 industry 
(see the Internet Appendix for a detailed description). Columns (2) and (5) report estimates of the 
corresponding second-stage equations.  Inst. net (sell/buy) volume/SHROUT is winsorized at 1%.  All columns 
include year and industry fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors, clustered by firm and corrected by Monte 
Carlo simulation for errors in estimating the expected trading volumes, are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** refer 
to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Target 
Dummy 
(2nd stage)   
Inst. sell 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Inst. buy 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Target 
Dummy 
(2nd stage) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT  -0.118***     
  (0.035)     
Inst. sell volume/SHROUT      0.127*** 
      (0.049) 
Inst. buy volume/SHROUT      -0.153*** 
      (0.037) 
Exp (inst sell volume)/SHROUT -1.712***   1.761*** 0.300**  
 (0.243)   (0.358) (0.146)  
Exp (inst buy volume)/SHROUT 2.379***   0.628*** 2.464***  
 (0.219)   (0.240) (0.303)  
ΔMF holding/ SHROUT        
       
Exp (MF fire sales)/SHROUT       
       
Exp (MF fire purchases)/SHROUT       
       
-log(Amihud) 0.000 0.004*  0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
log(MV) 0.001*** -0.008***  -0.000 0.000 -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Tobin's Q 0.000 -0.000  0.000** 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst. ownership -0.010*** 0.039***  0.031*** 0.023*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) 
Cont’d on next page   
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Cont’d from previous page. 
  
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Target 
Dummy 
(2nd stage)   
Inst. sell 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Inst. buy 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(1st stage) 
Target 
Dummy 
(2nd stage) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
Sales growth 0.000 -0.002*  0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROA 0.001** -0.003  0.004*** 0.005*** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.000 0.001  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Dividend yield 0.000 0.003  -0.004 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
R&D/Assets 0.000 -0.000**  0.000** 0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl index -0.017 0.092  0.042* 0.023 0.092 
 (0.024) (0.245)  (0.024) (0.025) (0.245) 
log(Analysts) -0.001*** -0.001  0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Return 0.001** -0.001  0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Year fixed effects YES YES  YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic F( 2, 7072) = 60.560                         
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 8.68) 
F( 1, 7072) = 19.544  
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% maximal size = 
7.03) 
Hansen J statistic χ2(1) = 0.191  N/A 
Observations 31,374 31,374  31,374 31,374 31,374 
R-squared (within) 0.463 0.014   0.696 0.723 0.015 
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Table IA.III: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting – IV 
Analysis (IV Estimates of Models in Table 3) 
This table reports two-stage pseudo maximum likelihood estimates of discrete-time proportional hazard 
(complementary log-log) models for activist targeting (Panel A) and for first acquisition of a toehold by a known 
activism-focused hedge fund (Panel B).  The uninstrumented counterparts are presented in Table 3 of the paper. 
Activism-focused hedge funds are defined as hedge funds that launch more than the median number of 
campaigns during the sample period. Observations are firm-quarters.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
In Panel A, the dependent variable is a “target” dummy, which equals one in the quarter in which a firm is 
targeted, and 0 in all prior quarters.  For each firm, the spell starts when at least one activism-focused hedge 
fund acquires a toehold in the firm, and ends when the firm is targeted in an activist campaign (i.e., the spell is 
complete) or when the sample ends (i.e., the spell is right-censored), whichever comes first. Firms with existing 
activism-focused hedge fund toeholds at the beginning of the sample period in 2000 suffer from left censorship, 
which is corrected by two approaches to ensure robustness.  CORRECTION 1 recovers the first acquisition of 
a toehold through 13F reports dating back to the first quarter of 1994.  CORRECTION 2 drops all left-censored 
spells.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is a “recognition” dummy, which equals one in the quarter in which 
at least one activism-focused hedge fund acquires a toehold in a firm for the first time, and 0 in all prior quarters.  
For each firm, the spell starts when the firm becomes exposed to the risk of a toehold acquisition (defined as 
the time when the firm’s shares become publicly tradable and can be purchased by a hedge fund), and ends 
when at least one activist has a toehold in the firm (i.e., the spell is complete) or when the sample ends (i.e., the 
spell is right-censored), whichever comes first.  Firms that already exist but are without any activism-focused 
hedge fund toeholds at the beginning of the sample period in 2000 suffer from left censorship, which is corrected 
by two alternative approaches.  CORRECTION 1 sets the start of a left-censored spell to the first quarter in 
which the firm appears in CRSP or the first quarter of 1994, whichever comes later.  CORRECTION 2 drops 
all left-censored spells.  In both panels, the endogenous regressor is institutional net volume.  Columns (1) and 
(3) report estimates of the first-stage equations, in which institutional net volume is expressed as a function of 
the excluded instruments – expected institutional buy and sell volumes calculated as the sums of individual 
institutions’ expected buying and selling in a given stock, conditional on their trading in other stocks outside 
the given stock’s SIC-2 industry (models in Columns (3) and (4) of Table IA.VI).  Columns (2) and (4) report 
estimates of the second-stage equations.  Inst. net volume/SHROUT is winsorized at 1%.  All models specify 
baseline hazards as piecewise-constant, by including survival duration fixed effects.  Survival duration is 
discrete and measured as the number of quarters from the beginning of the spell.  In addition, all models include 
vintage, calendar year-quarter, and industry fixed effects.  All control variables are as of the end of the prior 
quarter.  Robust standard errors, clustered by survival duration and corrected by Monte Carlo simulation for 
errors in estimating the expected trading volumes, are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.   
(See next page) 
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Table IA.III, cont’d: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting – 
IV Analysis (IV Estimates of Models in Table 3) 
Panel A: Failure = First Activist Targeting Firm 
  CORRECTION 1    CORRECTION 2  
  
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT     
(1st Stage)  
(1) 
Target 
Dummy     
(2nd Stage)  
(2)   
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT     
(1st Stage)  
(3) 
Target 
Dummy     
(2nd Stage)  
(4) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT  -2.414***   -2.317*** 
  (0.720)   (0.838) 
Exp. (inst. sell volume)/SHROUT -2.810***   -2.783***  
 (0.573)   (0.608)  
Exp. (inst. buy volume)/SHROUT 3.989***   4.422***  
 (0.436)   (0.631)  
-log(Amihud) -0.001 -0.057  -0.002* -0.210 
 (0.001) (0.169)  (0.001) (0.204) 
log(MV) 0.001* -0.422***  0.001*** -0.398*** 
 (0.000) (0.083)  (0.000) (0.086) 
Tobin's Q 0.000 -0.039  0.000 -0.052 
 (0.000) (0.033)  (0.000) (0.043) 
Inst. ownership -0.010*** 1.445***  -0.012*** 1.456*** 
 (0.002) (0.261)  (0.002) (0.300) 
Sales growth 0.000 -0.141  0.000 -0.106 
 (0.000) (0.096)  (0.000) (0.085) 
ROA 0.003** -0.413*  0.002** -0.476** 
 (0.001) (0.249)  (0.001) (0.197) 
Leverage 0.002*** -0.236  0.002*** -0.265 
 (0.001) (0.214)  (0.001) (0.251) 
Dividend yield 0.001 0.383*  0.002 0.423** 
 (0.002) (0.224)  (0.002) (0.169) 
R&D/Assets 0.003 -0.802  0.002 -0.920 
 (0.002) (0.620)  (0.002) (0.602) 
Herfindahl index -0.047* -4.411  -0.068* -12.747 
 (0.025) (11.356)  (0.039) (14.629) 
log(Analysts) -0.001** 0.014  -0.001*** 0.062 
 (0.000) (0.090)  (0.000) (0.090) 
Return 0.000 -0.240  -0.000 -0.246 
 (0.001) (0.153)  (0.000) (0.153) 
      
Survival duration (in quarters) fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Vintage fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Year-quarter fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic F(2, 55) = 41.846                 
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 19.93)  
F(2, 30) = 37.598                  
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 19.93) 
Hansen J statistic χ2(1) = 0.119  χ2(1) = 0.244 
Observations 65,370 65,370  47,878 47,878 
Pseudo-likelihood ratio statistic N/A 410   N/A 304 
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Table IA.III, cont’d: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Toehold Acquisition and Targeting – 
IV Analysis (IV Estimates of Models in Table 3) 
Panel B: Failure = First Activism-Focused Hedge Fund Acquiring Toehold in Firm 
  CORRECTION 1   CORRECTION 2  
  
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT     
(1st Stage)  
(1) 
First 
Toehold 
Dummy     
(2nd Stage)  
(2)   
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT     
(1st Stage)  
(3) 
First 
Toehold 
Dummy     
(2nd Stage)  
(4) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT  -0.270   1.685 
  (0.660)   (1.332) 
Exp. (inst. sell volume)/SHROUT -3.185***   -5.975***  
 (0.702)   (0.522)  
Exp. (inst. buy volume)/SHROUT 3.050***   6.348***  
 (0.479)   (0.445)  
-log(Amihud) 0.001* 0.465***  -0.001 0.872*** 
 (0.000) (0.071)  (0.001) (0.160) 
log(MV) 0.001*** 0.151***  0.001 -0.080 
 (0.000) (0.037)  (0.001) (0.053) 
Tobin's Q 0.000* -0.004  0.000 -0.008 
 (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.008) 
Inst. ownership -0.005** 0.626***  -0.004 0.457 
 (0.002) (0.087)  (0.005) (0.280) 
Sales growth 0.000* -0.010  0.000 0.018 
 (0.000) (0.019)  (0.000) (0.042) 
ROA 0.002*** 0.293***  0.004*** 0.136 
 (0.000) (0.054)  (0.001) (0.115) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.051  0.003 -0.051 
 (0.001) (0.066)  (0.002) (0.120) 
Dividend yield -0.000 -0.023  0.006 -0.198 
 (0.001) (0.379)  (0.010) (0.706) 
R&D/Assets 0.000 -0.004  0.000 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index -0.005 6.571  -0.044 2.409 
 (0.038) (4.443)  (0.081) (11.239) 
log(Analysts) 0.000 -0.097***  0.002** 0.203*** 
 (0.000) (0.030)  (0.001) (0.063) 
Return 0.001*** 0.055***  0.001* 0.098 
 (0.000) (0.013)  (0.001) (0.068) 
      
Survival duration (in quarters) fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Vintage fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Year-quarter fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic F(2, 55) = 20.391                  
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 19.93)  
F(2, 27) = 116.420                 
(S-Y crit. val. at 10% 
maximal size = 19.93) 
Hansen J statistic χ2(1) = 1.111  χ2(1) = 4.306 
Observations 53,448 53,448  6,009 6,009 
Pseudo-likelihood ratio statistic N/A 4,254   N/A 713 
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Table IA.IV: Trading in Target Stocks by Top Institutional Sellers and Buyers  
This table presents statistics on the top non-activist institutions’ combined trading, as a percentage of shares 
outstanding, in targets of activist campaigns.  The sample includes 643 campaigns in 2000-2007. In Panel A 
(Panel B), top institutions are the two largest sellers (buyers) in each target on the event date.  In Panel C (Panel 
D), top institutions are the five largest sellers (buyers) in each target during the 60-day period in which the 
hedge funds report their trades.  For each campaign, days t-60, t-240, and t+30 refer to days -60, -240, and +30 
from the Schedule 13D file date, and event date refers to the date on which the hedge fund’s ownership crosses 
the 5% reporting threshold.  Institution is a unique combination of client and client manager code in Ancerno. 
Event Window N Mean St. Dev. 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
         
Panel A: Top 2 sellers (combined) on the event date 
[t-240, t-60) 278 0.00% 1.81% -0.74% -0.04% 0.03% 0.28% 1.01% 
         
[t-60, Event Date) 309 -0.44% 1.31% -1.55% -0.43% -0.05% 0.00% 0.11% 
Event Date 365 -0.44% 1.72% -0.96% -0.29% -0.07% -0.02% 0.00% 
(Event Date, File Date] 224 -0.35% 0.67% -1.12% -0.35% -0.08% -0.01% 0.00% 
         
[t-60, File Date] 365 -1.02% 2.72% -2.79% -0.95% -0.25% -0.03% 0.00% 
(File Date, t+30] 207 -0.38% 0.88% -1.21% -0.45% -0.05% 0.00% 0.02% 
         
Panel B: Top 2 buyers (combined) on the event date 
[t-240, t-60) 242 0.26% 1.19% -0.08% 0.00% 0.05% 0.20% 0.68% 
         
[t-60, Event Date) 298 0.32% 1.21% -0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.21% 0.72% 
Event Date 343 0.13% 0.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.10% 0.32% 
(Event Date, File Date] 241 0.17% 0.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.09% 0.46% 
         
[t-60, File Date] 343 0.53% 1.55% 0.00% 0.02% 0.08% 0.43% 1.11% 
(File Date, t+30] 266 0.09% 0.57% -0.13% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 0.22% 
         
Panel C: Top 5 sellers (combined) during t-60 to the file date 
[t-240 to t-60) 536 0.26% 2.30% -1.62% -0.35% 0.06% 0.81% 2.32% 
         
[t-60 to Event Date) 578 -2.11% 3.08% -5.13% -2.62% -1.11% -0.38% -0.06% 
Event Date 237 -0.69% 2.48% -1.72% -0.44% -0.13% -0.04% -0.01% 
(Event to File Dates] 371 -0.85% 1.88% -2.25% -0.72% -0.24% -0.05% -0.01% 
         
[t-60 to File Date] 595 -2.86% 4.03% -6.72% -3.70% -1.59% -0.51% -0.13% 
(File Date to t+30] 367 -0.50% 1.14% -1.46% -0.57% -0.09% 0.00% 0.05% 
         
Panel D: Top 5 buyers (combined) during t-60 to the file date 
[t-240, t-60) 489 0.72% 1.63% -0.32% 0.01% 0.23% 0.96% 2.64% 
         
[t-60, Event Date) 570 1.36% 2.21% 0.06% 0.23% 0.65% 1.64% 3.56% 
Event Date 235 0.16% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.15% 0.38% 
(Event Date, File Date] 409 0.44% 1.20% 0.00% 0.01% 0.10% 0.36% 1.05% 
         
[t-60, File Date] 587 1.69% 2.56% 0.09% 0.28% 0.84% 2.09% 4.40% 
(File Date, t+30] 464 0.01% 0.82% -0.57% -0.09% 0.01% 0.16% 0.62% 
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Table IA.V: Trading in Non-Target Stocks by Top Institutional Sellers and Buyers 
This table presents statistics on the top non-activist institutions’ trading in stocks not targeted in activist 
campaigns in 2000-2007.  In Panel A (Panel B), top institutions are the two largest sellers (buyers) in each target 
on the event date.  In Panel C (Panel D), top institutions are the five largest sellers (buyers) in each target during 
the 60-day period in which the hedge funds report their trades.  For each campaign, days t-60, t-240, and t+30 
refer to days -60, -240, and +30, respectively, from the Schedule 13D file date, and event date refers to the date 
on which the hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 5% reporting threshold.  Institution is a unique combination of 
client and client manager code in Ancerno. 
Event Window N 
Days 
Traded 
in Period 
Sell 
Principal/ 
Total 
Principal 
# Stocks 
Sold/ # 
Stocks 
Traded 
Buy Trade 
Size  
($ Million) 
Sell Trade 
Size  
($ Million) 
# Days 
Traded/ 
Total # 
Days in 
Sample 
        
Panel A: Top 2 sellers (combined) on the event date 
[t-240, t-60) 343 84 49.54% 48.47% 0.418 0.492 53.39% 
        
[t-60, Event Date) 364 28 49.59% 49.25% 0.395 0.448 52.92% 
Event Date 356 1 56.47% 58.12% 0.390 0.366 54.26% 
(Event Date, File Date] 346 7 51.11% 50.44% 0.404 0.429 54.41% 
        
[t-60, File Date] 365 35 50.41% 49.98% 0.393 0.436 53.27% 
(File Date, t+30] 350 17 50.91% 50.94% 0.420 0.476 53.75% 
        
Panel B: Top 2 buyers (combined) on the event date 
[t-240, t-60) 325 87 40.83% 39.68% 0.342 0.719 53.38% 
        
[t-60, Event Date) 340 28 39.34% 37.62% 0.360 0.850 53.36% 
Event Date 336 1 31.46% 28.10% 0.311 0.727 53.85% 
(Event Date, File Date] 332 8 38.21% 35.61% 0.354 0.965 53.99% 
        
[t-60, File Date] 343 36 38.77% 36.85% 0.340 0.858 53.25% 
(File Date, t+30] 337 17 40.11% 38.31% 0.392 1.231 53.59% 
        
Panel C: Top 5 sellers (combined) during t-60 to the file date 
[t-240, t-60) 586 83 49.44% 48.36% 0.459 0.688 52.32% 
        
[t-60, Event Date) 592 28 50.32% 49.81% 0.466 0.543 52.20% 
Event Date 572 1 50.58% 50.04% 0.422 0.455 56.26% 
(Event Date, File Date] 565 11 50.42% 49.98% 0.449 0.517 53.62% 
        
[t-60, File Date] 595 38 50.55% 50.10% 0.460 0.533 52.11% 
(File Date, t+30] 580 17 49.62% 49.22% 0.493 0.561 52.95% 
        
Panel D: Top 5 buyers (combined) during t-60 to the file date 
[t-240, t-60) 578 83 43.53% 41.86% 0.396 0.685 52.53% 
        
[t-60, Event Date) 585 28 43.11% 41.18% 0.446 0.896 52.17% 
Event Date 558 1 44.22% 41.89% 0.415 0.625 56.21% 
(Event Date, File Date] 557 9 43.20% 41.42% 0.451 1.102 53.83% 
        
[t-60, File Date] 587 36 43.07% 41.14% 0.444 1.205 52.03% 
(File Date, t+30] 579 17 44.19% 42.93% 0.445 1.275 52.61% 
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Table IA.VI: Probability That Individual Institution Will Buy or Sell Generic Stock as Function of Its 
Trading in Other Stocks 
This table reports OLS estimates for linear models of the probability that an institution buys or sells a generic 
stock conditional on its trading in other stocks outside the generic stock’s SIC-2 industry.  Observations are 
institution-stock-days. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The probabilities of buying and selling are 
estimated separately.  The sample covers (i) all institutions that trade target stocks at least twice during the 
60-day period before a campaign file date, and (ii) all stocks traded at least once by these institutions during 
the 60-day period.  For computational reasons, the estimation is performed separately for each calendar 
quarter during the sample period 2000-2007.  Coefficient estimates, averaged across all quarters, are reported.  
All explanatory variables are contemporaneous, unless noted as lagged.  Standard errors, calculated as in 
Fama and Macbeth (1973), are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
  
Sell Fraction = Dollar 
Selling Volume/ Total 
Dollar Trading Volume  
Sell Fraction = Number of 
Stocks Sold/ Total Number 
of Stocks Traded 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Buy Sell  Buy Sell 
      
Dummy[trade other stocks] 0.201*** 0.038***  0.226*** 0.023*** 
 (0.013) (0.005)  (0.013) (0.005) 
Dummy[trade other stocks] -0.172*** 0.119***  -0.228*** 0.150*** 
    x Sell fraction (0.013) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.010) 
Dummy[trade only one other stock] -0.110*** -0.065***  -0.105*** -0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.006) 
Dummy[sell] l1 0.006 0.306***  0.011* 0.304*** 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Dummy[buy] l1 0.272*** 0.006**  0.267*** 0.008** 
 (0.009) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.003) 
Dummy[trade other stocks] l1 -0.063*** -0.025***  -0.069*** -0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.004) 
Dummy[trade other stocks] l1 0.018*** -0.022***  0.040*** -0.040*** 
    * Sell fraction l1 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Fraction of trading days during sample 0.003 -0.028***  -0.005 -0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.005) 
Return l1 0.004 -0.004  0.008 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
CRSP value-weighted return 0.322*** -0.041  0.254** 0.004 
 (0.113) (0.060)  (0.106) (0.056) 
VIX 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
      
Average N 11,367,529 11,367,529  11,367,529 11,367,529 
Average R-squared 0.150 0.144  0.158 0.153 
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Table IA.VII: Effect of Institutional Trading on Activist Purchases by Level of Activism Benefits  
– IV Analysis  (IV Estimates of Models in Table 7) 
This table reports limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates for regressions of activist purchases 
of target shares for targets with varying levels of activism benefits.  The OLS counterparts are presented in Table 
7 of the paper.  The sample includes firms targeted by hedge fund activists in 2000-2007.  Observations are 
campaign-days. The dependent variable is net hedge fund volume as a percentage of shares outstanding, and the 
endogenous regressors are institutional net volume and its interaction with High benefits dummy.  In Columns 
(1)-(3), potential benefits from activism are proxied by a firm’s propensity to be targeted estimated as in Column 
(1) of Table 2 of the paper (without institutional trading variables).  High benefits dummy equals one if the target 
propensity is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise.  In Columns (4)-(6), the potential benefits are 
proxied by the total toehold of known activist hedge funds at the end of the most recent quarter before the 
campaign start.  High benefits dummy equals one if the total toehold is greater than the sample median, and zero 
otherwise.  Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) report estimates of the first-stage equations, in which the endogenous 
regressors are expressed as a function of the excluded instruments – (i) expected institutional net volume 
calculated as the sums of individual institutions’ expected net trading volume in target stocks, conditional on their 
trading in non-target stocks outside the target’s SIC-2 industry (models in Columns (3) and (4) of Table IA.VI), 
and (ii) interaction between the expected institutional net volume and High benefits dummy.  Columns (3) and (6) 
report estimates of the second-stage equations.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A of the paper. Net 
hedge fund volume/SHROUT and Inst. net volume/SHROUT are winsorized at 1%. All models include campaign 
fixed-effects.  All explanatory variables are contemporaneous, unless noted as lagged.  Standard errors, clustered 
by campaign and corrected by Monte Carlo simulation for errors in estimating the expected trading volumes, are 
in parentheses.  *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Benefits: Target Propensity Score   Benefits: Total Hedge Fund Toehold 
 
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT       
(1st stage) 
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT 
x High 
benefits 
dummy        
(1st stage) 
Net HF 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(2nd stage)  
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT      
(1st stage) 
Inst. net 
volume 
/SHROUT 
x High 
benefits 
dummy            
(1st stage) 
Net HF 
volume 
/SHROUT 
(2nd stage) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT   -0.293***    -0.266* 
   (0.112)    (0.137) 
Inst. net volume/SHROUT   0.193**    0.149* 
     x High benefits dummy   (0.097)    (0.076) 
Exp. (inst. net volume)/SHROUT 0.420*** -0.004   0.384*** -0.001  
 (0.054) (0.003)   (0.043) (0.002)  
Exp. (inst. net volume)/SHROUT -0.009 0.419***   0.079 0.473***  
     x High benefits dummy (0.071) (0.046)   (0.073) (0.060)  
        
Market condition controls Lags 1 to 5 of net HF volume/SHROUT, lag 1 of inst. sell and buy 
volumes/SHROUT, CRSP value-weighted return, VIX, adjusted turnover, and 
lags 1 to 5 of abnormal return and abnormal Amihud 
Campaign-level controls Campaign dummies 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic F(1, 618) = 40.336 (S-Y crit. val. at 
10% maximal size = 7.03) 
 F(1, 618) = 54.685 (S-Y crit. val. at 
10% maximal size = 7.03) 
N 16,274 16,274 16,274  18,117 18,117 18,117 
R-squared (within) 0.042 0.035 0.033   0.042 0.044 0.038 
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Table IA.VIII: Analysis of Institutional Transaction Times in Trading Target and Other Stocks 
This table reports mean statistics for institutions’ order decision, placement, and execution times in trading 
activist targets and other stocks.  The sample period is 2000-2007, and the sample includes all firms with 
available trading data from Ancerno.  Institutional transactions include all transactions of the top two selling 
clientcodes (in the target stocks) on each campaign event date.  Observations are institution-stock-days.  For 
each campaign, day t-60 (t-240) refers to day -60 (-240) from the file date, and event date refers to the date 
on which the hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 5% reporting threshold.  Decision time is the time at which 
the decision to trade is made.  Placement time is the time at which the sell-side broker receives the order from 
the institution.  Execution time is the time at which the entire order is completely executed. 
Panel A: Institutional SELL Transactions in Target Stocks 
Period N   
Decision 
Time 
Placement 
Time 
Execution 
Time 
      
[t-240, t-60) 6,624  9:37 10:53 14:34 
[t-60, Event Date) 1,337  9:37 10:31 15:06 
Event Date 494  9:33 10:21 15:10 
(Event Date, File Dates] 497  9:34 10:22 15:06 
(File Date, t+30] 1,564  9:37 10:40 14:55 
            
 
Panel B: Institutional SELL Transactions in Other Stocks 
Period N   
Decision 
Time 
Placement 
Time 
Execution 
Time 
      
[t-240, t-60) 3,547,297  9:38 10:45 14:49 
[t-60, Event Date) 594,585  9:42 10:42 14:58 
Event Date 187,135  9:38 10:40 15:00 
(Event Date, File Dates] 205,183  9:38 10:53 14:48 
(File Date, t+30] 923,432  9:39 10:40 14:59 
            
 
Panel C: Institutional BUY Transactions in Other Stocks 
Period N   
Decision 
Time 
Placement 
Time 
Execution 
Time 
      
[t-240, t-60) 3,863,946  9:38 10:29 15:07 
[t-60, Event Date) 666,511  9:38 10:24 15:14 
Event Date 191,436  9:38 10:34 15:08 
(Event Date, File Dates] 253,084  9:34 10:30 15:13 
(File Date, t+30] 1,046,921  9:37 10:26 15:15 
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Table IA.IX: Analysis of Institutional and Hedge Fund Transaction Costs in Trading Target and 
Other Stocks 
This table reports mean statistics for transaction costs incurred by activist hedge funds and other institutions 
in trading activist targets and other stocks.  The sample period is 2000-2007, and the sample includes all 
firms with available trading data from Ancerno.  Institutional transactions include all transactions of the top 
two selling clientcodes (in the targets) on each campaign event date.  Hedge fund transactions are available 
only for the 60-day period immediately preceding the filing date of SEC Schedule 13D.  Observations are 
institution-stock-days or hedge fund-stock-days.  For each campaign, day t-60 (t-240) refers to day -60 (-
240) from the file date, and event date refers to the date on which the hedge fund’s ownership crosses the 
5% reporting threshold.  Transaction costs are measured as the difference between transaction price and 
volume-weighted average price (VWAP) on the day of the transaction, expressed as a percentage of VWAP.  
*, **, and *** refer to statistical significance (of the difference in means, based on standard errors clustered 
by stock) at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
    Institutions 
Hedge 
Funds 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Period 
BUY Other 
Stocks 
SELL Other 
Stocks 
SELL Target 
Stocks 
Difference 
(2) - (1) 
Difference 
(3) - (2) 
        
(A) t-240 to t-60 0.016 3.255*** 2.854*** 3.239*** -0.401 - 
(B) t-60 to Event Date 1.721*** 3.003*** 2.257 1.282*** -0.746 -50.150** 
(C) Event Date -1.014*** 7.489*** 10.709*** 8.503*** 3.220 -7.302 
(D) Event to File Dates 1.689*** 2.881*** -0.236 1.192*** -3.118* 35.765 
(E) File Date to t+30 0.646*** 3.234*** 4.050*** 2.588*** 0.816 - 
        
(F) Difference (B) - (A) 1.705*** -0.252** -0.597 -1.957*** -0.345  
(G) Difference (C) - (A) -1.030*** 4.233*** 7.855** 5.264*** 3.621  
(H) Difference (D) - (A) 1.673*** -0.374* -3.090 -2.047*** -2.716  
(I) Difference (E) - (A) 0.629*** -0.021 1.196 -0.650*** 1.217   
 
